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WHEN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION IS 
CRIMINAL 
L. SONG RICHARDSON* 
Medical researchers engaged in human experimentation commit 
criminal acts seemingly without consequence. Whereas other actors who 
violate bodily integrity and autonomy are routinely penalized with 
convictions for assault, fraud, and homicide, researchers escape criminal 
punishment. This Article begins to scrutinize this undercriminulizution 
phenomenon and provides a framework for understanding why researchers 
are not prosecuted for their crimes. It argues that their exalted social 
status, combined with the perceived social benejt of their reseurch, 
immunizes them from use of the criminal sanction. Whether these constitute 
suflcient grounds to give researchers a pass from punishment ibs u 
signiJicant question because the state's failure to act creates expressive 
harms. It displays attitudes towards victims and perpetmtors rhut 
negatively affect the values of autonomy and dignity in medicul ~vseurch. 
Moreover, alternative sanctions not only lack the same expressive impcrct, 
but may also inadequately police criminal harm, This Article concludes 
that this implicit immunity is harmful to socieiy and incon.si.stenr with 
criminal law policy. 
An unacknowledged problem exists in the realm of human subject 
experimentation: criminal acts are being committed seemindy without 
consequence. The individuals escaping punishment are no ordinary 
individuals; rather, they are medical researchers whose exalted social status 
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combined with the social benefits of their research appear to immunize 
them from punishment. Consider the following examples:' 
Pregnant women become unwitting guinea pigs in an experiment 
testing a medication to prevent miscarriages. As a result, their daughters 
. and sons are at higher risk for cancer. The researchers are never 
prosecuted.2 
A patient becomes an unwitting participant in an experiment to test the 
safety and effectiveness of an ocular implant. Before implanting the device, 
the researcher tells him that it is "quite safe" and a "tried and true method" 
of vision correction, rather than the truth-that the FDA has not approved 
the device. The victim suffers permanent damage to his eye.3 The 
researcher is never prosecuted. 
A healthy twenty-four-year-old woman participates in an asthma 
study. Doctors ask her to inhale a drug without telling her that this is an 
experimental use of the drug, previous inhalations resulted in death, and the 
FDA has not approved the procedure. She dies.4 The researchers are never 
prosecuted. 
This Article addresses the significant, yet largely unexplored, question 
of why medical researchers escape criminal p~nishment.~ Whereas other 
Other examples of research misconduct also exist. See, e.g,, United States v. Stanley, 
438 U.S. 669 (1987) (injecting serviceman secretly with chemicals); Barrett v. United States, 
689 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1982) (unwitting participant in chemical warfare experiment); 
Heinrich v. Sweet, 49 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D. Mass. 1999) (unwitting subjects in radiation 
experiments); White v. Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380 (E.D. Wash. 1998) (same); Stadt v. Univ. 
of Rochester, 921 F. Supp. 1023 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (same); In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 
874 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (same); Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 
(Cal. 1990) (surreptitious harvesting of tissue); Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 
807 (Md. 2001) (testing lead abatement strategies on indigent children without adequately 
informing parents of risks); Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 452 N.Y.S.2d 875 (App. 
Div. 1982) (enrolling premature infants in experiment without parental knowledge or 
consent); Friter v. IOLAB Corp., 607 A.2d 1111 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (implanting 
experimental device into patient's eye without consent); Complaint, Robertson ex re[. 
Robertson v. McGee, 2002 WL 535045 (N.D. Okla. 2002) (No. 01CV0060H(M)), 2001 WL 
34783383 (deceiving patients during cancer vaccine study); John Solomon, Government 
Tested AIDS Drugs on Foster Kids, MSNBC.COM, May 4,2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/ 
id177361571 (using children in foster care in seven states as guinea pigs to test HIV drugs 
without permission). 
Minkv. Univ. of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978). 
Kus v. Sherman Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 1214,1216 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). 
4 See Letter from the Office of Human Research Prot. (OHRP) to Dr. Edward D. Miller, 
Johns Hopkins Univ. Sch. of Med. (July 19, 2001), available at http://www.s~krpla~.~Om/ 
bioethicslletter.htm1; Warning Letter from Joanne L. Rhoads, Ctr. For Drug Evaluation & 
Research, FDA, to Dr. Alkis Togias, Johns Hopkins Asthma & Allergy Ctr. (Mar. 31,2003), 
available at h~~~~~~~.~~~la~.c~m/bioethics/warnin~letter.~df. 
5 In recent years, a number of cases have exposed misconduct by researchers in human 
subject experiments. See supra note 1. This has caused many commentators to question 
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actors who violate bodily integrity and autonomy are routinely punished 
with convictions for assault, fraud, and homicide, researchers walk away 
from similar crimes un~anctioned.~ This Article is meant to begin a 
conversation that considers why criminal sanctions are not utilized in the 
context of human subject research and scrutinizes whether criminal 
punishment is an important, but overlooked, mechanism for protecting the 
dignitary interests of human subjects. Given the rise in human subject 
experimentation as a result of biotechnology research, this is a critical and 
timely question. 
This Article examines two forms of intentional misconduct. Each, like 
the illustrations above, involves a researcher's purposeful and deliberate 
failure to obtain consent, thereby violating an individual's interest in self- 
determination and autonomy. The first type of misconduct is that of 
researchers who conduct experiments on individuals without their 
knowledge. The second is that of researchers who deliberately fail to 
disclose to individuals the known and obvious risks of participation in an 
experiment. This occurs, for example, when a researcher intentionally fails 
to utilize, or significantly alters, an approved informed consent document. 
The misconduct involves acts that the criminal law typically punishes: 
intentional, deceptive, and non-consensual contact with the person of 
an~ the r .~  These acts are customarily prosecuted because they violate one of 
existing policing mechanisms. See Alan Meisel, A "Dignitary Tort" as a Bridge Between 
the Idea of Informed Consent and the Law of Informed Consent, 16 LAW MED. & HEALTH 
CARE 210, 212 (1988); E. Haavi Morreim, Litigation in Clinical Research: Malpractice 
Doctrines Versus Research Realities, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 474 (2004) [hereinafter 
Morreim, Litigation in Clinical Research]; E. Haavi Morreim, The Clinical Investigator as 
Fiduciary: Discarding a Misguided Idea, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 586 (2005) [hereinafter 
Morreim, The Clinical Investigator as Fiduciary]; Grant H. Morris, Dissing Disclosure: Just 
m a t  the Doctor Ordered, 44 ANZ. L. REV. 313 (2002); Leonard L. Riskin, Informed 
Consent: Looking for the Action, 1975 LAW FORUM 580, 596; Marjorie Maguire Shultz, 
From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219 
(1985). However, none comprehensively explore the role that the criminal law can play in 
addressing dignitary and actual harms to individuals in research. But see LORI ANDREWS &
DOROTHY NELKIN, BODY BAZAAR: THE MARKET FOR HUMAN TISSUE IN THE BIOTECHNOLOGY 
AGE (1999); James T. O'Reilly, Elders, Surgeons, Regulators, Jurors: Are Medical 
Experimentation's Mistakes Too Easily Buried?, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 317, 368 (2000) ("If 
systemic safety problems expose elderly patients to harm, criminal prosecution is a proper 
respon~e,'~). 
Importantly, new criminal legislation is not necessary to punish the conduct discussed 
in this Article. The acts constitute criminal conduct under existing statutes. See infra note 
196. 
' These crimes include the offenses of fraud, assault, battery, rape, and murder. Fraud 
has been described as "the very essence of wrong; conduct that has always been and always 
will be wrong, according to the common judgment of mankind; conduct that cannot be 
dressed up or manipulated or associated so as to invest it with any element of right." Morris, 
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our most cherished entitlements-freedom from intentional and non- 
consensual contacts with our person.8 
There is no question that informed consent is lacking in these cases.9 I 
focus upon these "easy" cases of non-disclosure in order to center full 
attention on the question I seek to consider: why culpable acts in human 
experimentation, which eliminate an individual's right to make informed 
choices about what will be done to her body, are not punished. While other 
forms of misconduct in human subject research exist,'' and will be the 
subject of future articles, the fact that these straightforward cases of 
misconduct do not result in criminal punishment demonstrates the need to 
explore the initial question of why the criminal sanction is overlooked. 
This Article provides the first framework for understanding why 
research misconduct in the form of deceit and violations of bodily integrity 
currently escapes criminal punishment. The framework has two 
components, which I label "idealization bias" and "social benefit bias."" 
Idealization bias refers to the difficulty individuals may have in viewing 
researchers, who are often  doctor^,'^ as criminals deserving of punishment. 
Social benefit bias refers to the hypothesis that research misconduct is often 
ignored or forgiven because of the perceived societal value of the research. 
- - -  
supra note 5, at 322-23 (citing Knox v. Phoenix Leasing Inc., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 141, 147 (Ct. 
App. 1994)). 
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994) ("The protections of substantive due 
process have for the most part been accorded to . . . the right to bodily integrity." (citing 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847-49 (1992))); Schmerber V. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966) ("The integrity of the individual person is a cherished 
value of ow society."). 
I do not discuss cases that involve material misrepresentations made when seeking 
approval to conduct an experiment using human subjects. I also do not consider problems 
attendant to informed consent, such as whether individuals actually understand the document 
they sign. See, e.g., Diaz v. Hillsborough County Hosp. Auth., 165 F.R.D. 689,690 693-94 
(M.D. Fla. 1996) (involving pregnant women's suit against researchers, in part because the 
women did not understand the informed consent document they signed). The desirability of 
utilizing the criminal sanction in these more difficult cases will be discussed in future 
articles. 
lo For example, human subject researchers often violate the regulations that are meant to 
protect human subjects. See infa note 21 1. 
11 This Article does not contend that these biases represent the only explanations for the 
absence of criminal punishment. However, they are sufficiently credible to warrant 
attention. 
12 Morreim, The Clinical Investigator as Fiduciary, supra note 5, at 587 ("[Mlan~ 
volunteers are invited into research by their own physicians . . . . [Ilnvestigators [in Phase I 
dnrg trials] usually are physicians, but their relationship with volunteers is completely 
independent of the treatment setting." (citation omitted)); O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 321 ('In 
the face of health care cost reductions elsewhere in their budgets, more physicians and 
physician practice groups are now practicing some clinical research to boost profits."). 
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This Article posits that idealization and social benefit bias may affect 
decision-making in ways that can result in researchers being immunized 
from criminal punishment. This implicit immunity is harmful because the 
state's failure to punish researchers creates expressive harms by displaying 
attitudes towards victims and perpetrators that negatively affect the values 
of autonomy and dignity in medical research. While sanctions outside the 
criminal context do exist, these alternatives not only lack the same 
expressive impact, but also may inadequately police criminal harm. 
This Article unfolds in five parts. Part I1 discusses idealization and 
social benefit bias. Part I11 scrutinizes the expressive role of criminal 
punishment and the shortcomings of alternative sanctions. Part IV 
discusses the utility of imposing punishment. Part V addresses arguments 
against use of the criminal sanction and examines considerations that can 
guide policy. The Conclusion argues that criminal punishment can restore 
the protection of dignity and autonomy in human subject research. 
This Part explores whether cognitive biases can explain why culpable 
medical researchers escape criminal punishment. It draws from the lessons 
of social cognition research, which contribute to our understanding of how 
individuals process information and draw conclusions.13 The research 
demonstrates that people regularly employ "schemas" to quickly categorize 
and assimilate information.14 A schema can be ccconceptualized as a mental 
structure which contains general expectations and knowledge of the 
world."15 It "represents knowledge about a concept. . . , including its 
attributes . . . ."I6 Stereotypes are the best-known example of a ~chema.'~ 
l3 For a comprehensive review of this literature, see Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, 
Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1125 (2004); see also Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 1489 (2005) (utilizing social cognition research in the study of implicit racial bias). 
The approach is different from behavioral law and economics although similarities exist, 
See id. at 1494 n.21 (differentiating between his "behavioral realist" approach and "the 
cognitive psychological groundings of. . . behavioral law and economics"). For further 
reading on behavioral law and economics, and related literature, see BEHAVIORAL LAW & 
ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997); see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain PsychologicaZ 
Case for Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1165 (2003) (describing cognitive psychological 
concepts affecting decision-making). 
l4 See generally Chen & Hanson, supra note 13 (summarizing research). 
l5 Id. at 1133 (citation omitted), The term has been interpreted in different ways. Id. at 
1 131; Kang, supra note 13, at 1498 n.39. 
l6 Kang, supra note 13, at 1498 (citation omitted). 
l7 Chen & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1126-27. The concept of a schema is closely 
related to the concept of heuristics-rules of thumb or mental shortcuts-that can cause 
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Essentially, schemas provide a mechanism for people to make quick 
predictions, decisions, or judgments about the overwhelming amount of 
information they encounter.18 
Despite the necessity of employing schemas, they create the risk of 
biased decision-making because they "guide what we attend to, what we 
perceive, what we remember and what we infer."19 The two subparts that 
follow delineate two possible biases that may result from the schema we 
apply to researchers and to the work that they perform. These biases create 
the risk of faulty decision-making in the human subject research context 
and, thus, may explain the failure to utilize the criminal sanction to punish 
culpable medical researchers. The purpose of identifying these potential 
biases is to call attention to the possibility of their existence and encourage 
further empirical inquiry. Idealization bias is explored in Subpart A; 
Subpart B discusses social benefit bias. The words doctor and researcher 
are used interchangeably in this Part because the researchers engaged in 
human subject research are more often than not medical doctors.20 
predictable failures to accurately assess risk or result in judgment errors, as is discussed in 
the behavioral law and economics literature. Id. at 1197 (stating that inferential shortcuts 
include schemas or heuristics); see, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. 
Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, 
supra note 13, at 14 (discussing heuristics). 
'* Chen & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1132, 1145 ("Before individuals can draw 
inferences (that is, before they can apply a chosen schema to the concepts before them), they 
generally need to categorize or label . . . ."). 
l9 Id. at 1133 (citation omitted). 
20 See supra note 12; see also Frances H. Miller, Trusting Doctors: Tricky Business 
When It Comes to Clinical Research, 81 B.U. L. REV. 423,424-25 (2001) ("[Tlhe boundaries 
separating medical research from clinical practice are becoming increasingly hard to 
trace. . . . [Slome drug and device manufacturers now compensate primary care physicians 
for enrolling their patients in clinical studies." (citations omitted)). It is important to note 
that there are important differences between the doctor-patient relationship and the 
researcher-subject relationship. Some commentators argue that it is inaccurate to claim that 
a fiduciary relationship exists between researchers and their subjects. See, e.g., E. Haavi 
Morreim, Medical Research Litigation and Ma2practice Tort Doctrines: Courts on a 
Learning C'urve, 4 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1 (2003); Morreim, The Clinical Investigator 
as Fiduciary, supra note 5; Richard S. Saver, Medical Research and Intangible Harm, 74 U. 
Cm. L. REV. 941, 968 (2006) ("Whether a similar fiduciary relationship exists between 
investigator and research subject remains subject to vigorous debate."). Although courts 
have recognized that special duties exist between researcher and subject, the scope of these 
pronouncements remains unclear. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 
479,485 (Cal. 1990); Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807,818 (Md. 2001). 
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A. IDEALIZATION BIAS 
"[D]octors are revered as nearly godlike . . . ."21 
Role schemas, as the name suggests, help people decide what conduct 
to expect from those in certain roles.22 Generally, people do not expect 
criminal behavior from a doctor, despite substantial documentation of the 
commercialization of science and medicine23 and the incentives this creates 
for rn iscond~ct .~~ Instead, doctors are often placed on a pedestal.25 They 
-- - 
PriceGrabber.com, How Doctors Think, http://www.pricegrabber.com/search- 
books2.php/book~id=l506158l/search=How%2ODoctors%2OThistroducsitle (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2009) (providing synopsis of JEROME . GROOPMAN, HOW DOCTORS THINK 
(Houghton Mifflin 2007)). 
22 Chen & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1137 (citation omitted) (stating that role schemas 
refer to "the set of behaviors we expect[] of a person in a particular social position"). 
23 Medical research today is a multi-billion dollar industry. See Morreim, Litigation in 
Clinical Research, supra note 5, at 474 ("[Clinical trials] have become a huge business."); 
O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 349 ("Clinical research consumes an estimated four billion dollars 
annually . . . ." (citing OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., 
NO. OEI-0 1-97-00 191, INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS: PROMISING APPROACHES at A1 
(1998))); Kurt Eichenwald & Gina Kolata, Drug Trials Hide Conficts for Doctors, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 16, 1999, at A1 (reporting that researchers earn up to one million dollars per 
year). 
24 The commercialization of science increases incentives and temptations to commit bad 
acts. As one respected ethicist reports, "In countless discussions with research scientists, I 
have learned about their tampering with the principle of voluntary consent in order to get 
research underway, advance science, and obtain research grants for the sake of protecting 
their laboratories and professional advancement." Jay Katz, The Consent Principle of the 
Nuremberg Code: Its SigniJicance Then and Now, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE 
NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 226,23 1 (George 5. Annas 
& Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992); see also Michael Baram, Making Clinical Trials Safer for 
Human Subjects, 27 AM. J.L. & MED 253, 268-69 (2001) ("[P]rospects of financial gain are 
so tempting that researchers and organizations are inadvertently or even deliberately 
[violating] other FDA and NIH requirements intended to protect human subjects."). Doctors 
and researchers report that the most fiequent causes of research misconduct are pressures to 
obtain funding, pressures of career advancement, pressure to publish and to produce results, 
and pressure to succeed in a competitive environment. See JAMES A. WELLS, THE GALLUP 
ORG., FINAL REPORT: OBSERVING AND REPORTING SUSPECTED MISCONDUCT IN BIOMEDICAL 
RESEARCH 37 (2008), available at http://ori.dhhs.gov/research/intrra~documents/gallup~ 
finalreport.pdf; O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 324 (noting "the patent law advantage of taking a 
primary position for the innovator who patents a device first"); see also Lori A. Alvino, 
Note, Who's Watching the Watchdogs? Responding to the Erosion of Research Ethics by 
Enforcing Promises, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 893, 906-09 (2003) (discussing incentives that 
facilitate the erosion of informed consent). 
25 See JAMES M. LANG, LEARNING SICKNESS: A YEAR WITH CROHN'S DISEASE 40 (2004) 
("Our society assigns doctors especially revered places of authority and respect."); Mark A. 
Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463,478 (2002) ("[Platients yearn to have 
confidence in their doctors, to idealize them, to endow them with superhuman powers." 
(quoting HERMAN MILES SOMERS & ANNE RAMSAY SOMERS, DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND 
HEALTH INSURANCE: THE ORGANIZATION AND FLNANCING OF MEDICAL CARE 459 (1961))); 
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are perceived as healers and altruistic, honest actors who toil tirelessly for 
the betterment of mankind. Evidence of this schema can be seen in 
television portrayals and public opinion polls.26 In 2006, for example, a 
nationwide public opinion poll found that doctors and scientists are 
amongst the most trusted of occupations and professions." In fact, doctors 
are the most trusted occupation and scientists among the top three, above 
police officers and professors.28 
The role schema applied to doctors and researchers creates the risk of 
an idealization bias. This bias may affect how the acts of researchers are 
judged. Individuals may interpret the culpable acts of researchers as 
innocent mistakes or, at most, negligence, rather than as criminal. Hence, 
the idealization of doctors may explain the reluctance to prosecute them 
when they are involved in research misconduct. 
The evolution of tort doctrine in informed consent cases provides some 
evidence of this bias. Prior to the 1960s, courts strongly protected an 
individual's autonomy interests by recognizing the torts of assault or 
battery against doctors who either failed to adequately inform their patients 
about the risks of treatment or failed to abide by the consent obtained." 
The attitude of courts during this period is best expressed by Justice 
Cardozo's oft-quoted language: "Every human being of adult years and 
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; 
Valerie M. Harris, Being a Doctor: Pros, Cons and What It's Really Like, MoMMD, 
http://www.mommd.com/beingadoctor.shtml (last visited Feb. 2, 2009) ("For centuries, the 
physician has been one of the most respected members of society."). 
26 See Michael Pfau et al., The Influence of Television Viewing on Public Perceptions of 
Physicians, 39 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 441 (1995). The Emmy and Peabody award- 
winning drama House portrays a drug-addicted doctor who orders ethically problematic 
medical procedures, often without permission, that he believes are necessary. He is depicted 
as a medical genius whose acts can be forgiven because he obtains results. But see Rebecca 
M. Chory-Assad & Ron Tamborini, Television Doctors: An Analysis of Physicians in 
Fictional and Non-Fictional Television Programs, 45 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 499 (2001), 
available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi~m6836/is~3~45/ai~n25037085/p~l?~~~ 
artBody;coIl (finding that television portrayals, though still positive, are slightly less so than 
in 1995). 
27 THE HARRIS POLL, DOCTORS AND TEACHERS MOST TRUSTED AMONG 22 OCCUPATIONS 
AND PROFESSIONS: FEWER ADULTS TRUST THE PRESIDENT O TELL THE TRUTH (20061, 
http://~ww.ha~isinteractive.com/harri~~~o1]/index.a~~?~1~=688. The poll was conducted 
by telephone between July 7-10,2006, among a nationwide sample of 1002 U.S. adults. Id. 
28 Id. Scientists were trusted to be truthful by 77% of those surveyed, compared with 
police officers at 76% and professors at 75%. Id. But see Tara Parker-Pope, Doctor and 
Patient, Now at Odds, N.Y. TIMES, JuI. 29,2008. at F6. 
29 See, e.g., Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12; 15-16 (Minn. 1905); Rolater v. Strain, 137 
P. 96,97-99 (Okla. 1913). 
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and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent 
commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages."30 
By recognizing the torts of assault or battery in informed consent 
cases, courts placed the individual's right to self-determination at the fore. 
Doctors were held liable for violations of consent, whether or not the 
patient suffered any physical harm, because "the essence of the plaintiffs 
grievance consists in the offense to the dignity involved in the unpermitted 
and intentional invasion of the inviolability of his person. . . ."31 The 
doctor's good or bad faith was irrelevant because the injury justifying 
compensation was to the patient's right to be free from non-consensual 
contact with her person.32 
However, in the 1960s and 1970s' courts began to shield doctors from 
battery liability because they presumed that doctors were acting in good 
faith and for the benefit of the patient. As one court put it: 
We believe that medical treatment beyond the scope of a patient's consent should 
not be considered as an intentional tort or species of assault and battery as it has been 
viewed in the past. The doctor in a malpractice case is ordinarily not an actor who 
intends to inflict an injury on his patient and any legal theory which presumes that 
intent appears to be based upon an erroneous supposition. Instead, the doctor is not 
one who acts antisocially as one who commits assault and battery, but is an actor who 
in good faith intends to confer a benefit on the patient. 33 
Idealizing doctors in this fashion caused courts to view the 
consequences of battery liability as overly punitive.34 For example, if found 
liable in battery, a doctor might be required to pay damages out of pocket 
because malpractice insurance would not be available for "an arguably 
'criminal' act."35 Additionally, the possibility of an award of punitive 
30 Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (citing Pratt v. 
Davis, 79 N.E. 562 (Ill. 1906)). Justice Cardozo is often cited as the source of the modem 
doctrine of informed consent. Morris, supra note 5, at 317. But see Paul A. Lombardo, 
Phantom Tumors and Hysterical Women: Revising Our View of the Schloendorff Case, 33 
J.L. MED. &ETHICS 791,791 (2005) ("[Ilt would be surprising to find a serious commentator 
who used the Schloendorff opinion as the foundation of an argument about the origins of 
informed consent."). 
31 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 8 18 cmt. c (1965) (emphasis added). The tort 
allows for nominal damages for the offensive contact and compensation for emotional 
distress. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 5 9, at 35 (4th ed. 1971). 
32 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 3 1,§ 16, at 18; see Morreim, Litigation 
in Clinical Research, supra note 5, at 483 n.81 ("[Blattery protects the purely dignitary 
interest in the body that it be free from offensive contact." (citing Meisel, supra note 5, at 
16)). 
33 Dries v. Gregor, 424 N.Y.S.2d 561, 564 (App. Div. 1980) (citations omitted and 
emphasis added). 
34 Shultz, supra note 5, at 226. 
35 Trogun v. Fm&tman, 207 N.W.2d 297,313 (Wis. 1973). 
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damages raised concerns.36 Since courts presumed that doctors were acting 
in good faith and for the benefit of the patient, these outcomes seemed 
unduly harsh. Thus, courts began to treat non-consensual encroachments 
upon the sanctity of the body as a form of medical malpractice sounding in 
negligence.37 The concern for doctors appeared to overshadow 
considerations of individual dignity, autonomy, and self-determination. 
The courts' idealization of the medical profession persists even in 
cases involving researchers who act in bad faith. For instance, Heinrich v. 
was a class action lawsuit filed on behalf of terminally ill brain 
cancer patients who were subjects in radiation experiments without their 
knowledge.39 The patients thought they were receiving treatment and were 
unaware of the deception until a government report uncovering the 
experiments was published over forty years later.40 The plaintiffs sued in 
battery, alleging that the defendants "intentionally injected the class' 
decedents with toxic substances and irradiated the class' decedents without 
 ons sent.''^' The researchers acted in bad faith. The victims had not agreed 
to become research fodder, or to be injected with the experimental 
radioactive substance. However, despite evidence of intentional deceit, the 
court dismissed the battery claim and held that the action should be treated 
as a form of medical malpractice or negligence.42 
36 See, e.g., id. Other reasons cited by the Trogun court include that the failures to 
disclose do not constitute affirmative conduct and thus should not be conceptualized as an 
intentional tort, or as the type of contact or touching required for an intentional tort. Id. 
37 The claim "is in reality one for negligence in failing to conform to the proper standard, 
to be determined on the basis of expert testimony as to what disclosure should be made." 
PROSSER, supra note 31, 8 32, at 165. See generally Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 7-8 (Cal. 
1972) (holding that failure to warn of known risk sounds in negligence). 
38 44 F. Supp 2d 408 (1999). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 411. 
41 Heinrich ex rel. Heinrich v. Sweet, 49 F. Supp. 2d 27,38 (D. Mass. 1999). 
42 Id. Because the patients had consented to the procedure, but not to the injection of the 
radiation, the court found that this was an action based upon a lack of informed consent. 
Many courts utilize a negligence standard in cases involving a failure to obtain informed 
consent. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. 1972); Cobbs, 502 P.2d 1,7-8; 
Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676 (R.I. 
1972). A minority of jurisdictions allows medical battery claims for lack of informed 
consent. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Kull, 329 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1964); Mink v. Univ. of Chicago, 
460 F. S~pp.  713,718 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (citing Cathemer v. Hunter, 558 P.2d 975, 978 (Ariz. 
ct. App. 1976)); Perry v. Shaw, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 70 (Ct. App. 2001); Gragg v. Calandra, 
696 N.E.2d 1282 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); Kus v. Sherman Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 1214 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1995); Roberson v. Provident House, 576 So. 2d 992 (La. 1991); Duttry v. Patterson, 771 
A.2d 1255 (Pa. 2001); Morgan v. MacPhail, 704 A.2d 617,620 (Pa. 1997); Friter v. IOLAB 
Gorp., 607 A.2d 11 11 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Harvey v. Strickland, 566 S.E.2d 529 (S.C. 
2002); Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726 (Tenn. 1998). 
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Even in negligence cases, glimpses of idealization bias are present. 
The majority of jurisdictions utilize the "medical custom" standard as the 
basis for imposing liability.43 In determining whether the right to informed 
consent is breached, the focus of the inquiry is on what the medical 
community believes is reasonable to disclose.44 Reliance upon medical 
community standards assumes that the community will always act in good 
faith and in furtherance of the best interests of the patient. 
A growing number of jurisdictions utilize a standard that focuses upon 
the information a reasonable person would want to receive in determining 
liability.45 The question asked is whether a reasonable person would have 
consented to the procedure if he or she had been given the undisclosed 
information. The use of the reasonable person standard again reflects a 
concern for the idealized doctor because the standard was chosen to protect 
doctors from the vindictive patient by avoiding placing doctors "in jeopardy 
of the patient's hindsight and bitterne~s."~~ A subjective standard would 
recognize that the patient, not the doctor, has the right to decide what is in 
his or her best interest.47 
That we idealize doctors, even those acting in bad faith, demonstrates 
the efficacy of idealization bias. Indeed, such reverence overshadows 
concern for the patient's right to make informed decisions about what is 
done to her person and relegates protection of the individual's interests in 
her bodily integrity to a secondary status.48 The idealization phenomenon is 
43 See, e.g., Osborn v. Irwin Mem'l Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 124 (Ct. App. 
1992) (noting that medical custom standard is the majority rule). 
44 Id. 
45 See Jaime Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The 
+ 
Case for Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 429,430 (2006) (noting that 
almost half of jurisdictions utilize the reasonable patient standard). 
46 Canterbuy, 464 F.2d at 790-91. Only a minority of jurisdictions utilize a subjective 
test, and do so in order to provide strong protection to individual autonomy and decision- 
making. See, e.g., McPherson v. Ellis, 287 S.E.2d 892, 897 (N.C. 1982); Scott v. Bradford, 
606 P.2d 554,559 (Okla. 1980); Arena v. Gingrich, 748 P.2d 547,549 (Or. 1988); Millard v. 
Nagle, 587 A.2d 10, 13 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Flanagan v. Wesselhoeft, 712 A.2d 365, 370 
(R.I. 1998). 
47 Canterbuy, 464 F.2d at 781 ("[Ilt is the prerogative of the patient, not the physician, 
to determine for himself the direction in which his interests seem to lie."); Id. at 786 ("[Tlhe 
patient's right of self-decision shapes the boundaries of the duty to reveal."). Only a few 
jurisdictions utilize the subjective person standard. See Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 
1544, 1548-49 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Korman v. Mallin, 858 P.2d 1145, 1150-51 (Alaska 1993); 
Lugenbuhl v. Dowling, 676 So. 2d 602, 605-06 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Macy v. Blatchford, 8 
P.3d 204,209-1 1 (Or. 2000). 
4X Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost 
Containment, 85 IOWA L. REV. 261,366 (1999) ("[Platients can be harmed when they are 
prevented from making decisions about their own care, even when, or perhaps especiall?. 
when, no harm occurs."); see also Morreim, Litigation in Clinical Reseuvch, supra 
100 L. SONG RlCHAlPDSON [Vol. 99 
not new. For example, the long-standing therapeutic exception to informed 
consent allows doctors, in their sole discretion, to withhold information 
from a patient if they believe the information would cause psychological 
harm and thus hurt the patient's physical well-being.49 This exception 
implicitly assumes doctors acting in good faith and failing to disclose 
relevant information, not to serve their own ends, but for the benefit of the 
patient. 
Importantly, idealization bias can be overcome in individual cases.50 
ARer all, some doctors are prosecuted for criminal conduct. However, 
when these prosecutions occur, there is usually an explanation for why the 
role schema was conquered. In some cases, the person's role as a doctor 
was merely coincidental to the cond~ct.~' In others, alternative schemas 
were more salient. For example, the so-called War on Drugs likely 
"primes" prosecutors and law enforcement to be ever vigilant for evidence 
of improper drug distrib~tion.~~ Hence, doctors are prosecuted for allegedly 
improperly prescribing narcotic painkillers to patients.53 In these cases, the 
power of the War-on-Drugs prime can explain the ascendance of the drug- 
dealer schema over the doctor schema. In sum, when doctors are 
prosecuted, it appears that alternative schemas are more salient and thus 
defeat idealization bias.54 
-- 
note 5, at 480 ("Because standard informed consent doctrine limits recovery to cases 
featuring a physical or other separate injury, it can fail to honor human autonomy in cases 
where someone's right to choose has been abused without demonstrable physical damage." 
(footnote omitted)). 
49 See, e.g., Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1957). In Salgo, the court held that a risk which was remote did not have to be 
disclosed if, in the doctor's sole judgment, the patient would become so terrified that she 
would fail to obtain the surgery the doctor thought was necessary. Id. This is known as the 
"therapeutic exception" to informed consent. Because the doctor's duty is to "place the 
welfare of [the] patient above all else," the patient's right to autonomy in decision-making 
could be limited. Id.; see also Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 788-89 (upholding the therapeutic 
exception). 
Chen & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1175-77. 
This occurs when a doctor is prosecuted for rape or murder, for example. 
52 Priming '"refers to any experiences or procedures that bring a particular concept (or 
any other knowledge structure) to mind."' Chen & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1180 (citation 
omitted). 
53 See Press Release, U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., Doctor Charged with Illegal Drug 
Distribution (July 2, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.g~v/dea/pubs/states/newsr~~ 
atlanta070207.html. 
54 In the social cognition field, this is often referred to as "subtyping." Subtyping allows 
individuals to avoid reconceptualizing a schema, but rather create exceptions to the general 
rule. Chen & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1205 ("When confronted with disconfirming 
information individuals can carve out a special subschema for that evidence in a way that 
preserves more general schema-like an 'exception that proves the mle."'). 
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B. SOCIAL BENEFIT BIAS 
Another explanation for the failure to prosecute culpable researchers is 
that they are engaged in socially beneficial research.55 Researchers perform 
a service that society believes is worthy, beneficial, and important. 
Generally, our society accepts the practice of human subject research, 
despite the fact that serious injury and death can result,56 because it may 
lead to cures or treatments for devastating diseases.57 The desire to foster 
research that holds the promise of substantial potential benefits may create a 
willingness to turn a blind eye to intentional misconduct or an unawareness 
that one's interpretation of conduct is influenced by the motivation to 
encourage re~earch.~' This is what I refer to as social benefit bias. 
Social cognition research establishes that an individual's motivations 
can play a significant role in determining "which concepts, beliefs, and 
rules we apply to a judgment; we may be especially likely to apply those 
that are congruent with our goals."59 In fact, motivations may be the most 
important factor affecting the schema an individual adopts.60 The failure to 
punish culpable researchers may stem from fear that punishment would 
stymie medical research that we are motivated to promote. This desire to 
55 Researchers have been prosecuted for falsifying data. See infra note 98. But these 
prosecutions make sense since in neither instance is society benefited. Results based upon 
falsified data will not result in knowledge that helps develop cures or treatments for diseases, 
for example. 
56 Experiments involving human subjects can be therapeutic or non-therapeutic, 
Whitlock v. Duke Univ., 637 F. Supp. 1463, 1467 (M.D.N.C. 1986). Therapeutic 
experimentation provides a benefit to the subject, while non-therapeutic experimentation 
does not. Id. Many subjects in non-therapeutic research are healthy. Id, 
57 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, OTA-BA-337, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN 
BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS 56 (1987) ("There are nearly 
350 commercial biotechnology firms in the United States actively engaged in biotechnology 
research and commercial product development and approximately 25 to 30 percent appear to 
be engaged in research to develop a human therapeutic or diagnostic reagent. . . . Most, but 
not all, of the human therapeutic products are derived from human tissues and cells, or 
human cell lines or cloned genes."). Already, tests and treatments for diseases such as 
leukemia, cancer, diabetes, hepatitis-B, and infertility exist as a result of this important 
research. ALAN M. RUSSELL, THE BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION: AN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE (1988), cited in Thomas P. Dillon, Note, Source Compensation for Tissues und 
Cells Used in Biotechnical Research: Why a Source Shouldn't Share in the Profits, 64 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 628,628 n. 1 (1989). 
58 Individuals also may underestimate the possibility that they will become the victims of 
research misconduct. Psychological studies reveal that individuals have an inclination to be 
overconfident or overly optimistic when it comes to making risk assessments for themselves. 
Rachlinski, supra note 13, at 1172, 1191; Sunstein, supra note 13, at 1183 (discussing 
systematic overconfidence in risk judgments). 
59 Chen & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1183 n.341 (citation omitted). 
60 lil, at 1 183 (citation omitted). 
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advance research may affect how decision-makers interpret researchers' 
conduct and victims' harm. 
Perhaps the best example of social benefit bias, and its close 
relationship to idealization bias, is Moore v. Regents of the Universiw of 
California, a case involving surreptitious resear~h.~' Mr. Moore had a rare 
and deadly cancer known as hairy-cell leukemia in his spleen.62 He sought 
treatment from Dr. David Golde, a prominent cancer specialist at the UCLA 
Medical Center. He gave Dr. Golde permission to conduct a splenectomy 
(the surgical removal of his spleen) to treat his leukemia. After the 
successful procedure,63 Moore moved to ~ e a t t l e . ~ ~  
When Dr. Golde asked Moore to return for follow-up treatments, 
Moore was not suspicious. For the next seven years, Moore dutiklly flew 
from Seattle to California every few months, and underwent sometimes 
painful medical procedures that included withdrawing samples of 
"blood, . . . skin, bone marrow aspirate, and sperm."65 He made the trek 
because Dr. Golde asserted that the procedures were medically necessaryb6 
and that only he could perform them.67 Neither assertion was true. 
What Moore did not know was that prior to his surgery, Dr. Golde had 
developed research and financial interests in Moore's cells.68 The 
procedures Dr. Golde performed after the successful surgery had nothing to 
do with treating Moore's leukemia, which was in remission. Instead, Dr. 
Golde was actively conducting research on Moore's cells solely for 
financial gain and commercial advantage. Dr. Golde exploited the doctor- 
patient relationship to ensure that he had exclusive access to Moore's 
cells.69 When Moore specifically asked Dr. Golde whether there was any 
possible research interest or financial benefit in his bodily substances, Dr. 
Golde repeatedly told him no and "actively discouraged such inquiries."70 
In fact, Dr. Golde went so far as to say that "there was no commercial or 
financial value" in Moore's tissue.71 
- --  
a 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
62 Id. at 481. 
63 Id. 
64 Rebecca Skloot, Taking the Least of You, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 16, 2006, at 39,41 
available at http://~ww.nytimes.corn/2006/04/16/magazinell6tissue.html. 
65 Moore, 793 P.2d at 481 (internal quotation marks omitted); Skloot, supra note 64, at 2. 
66 Moore, 793 P.2d at 48 1. 
67 Id. 
Id. 
69 Id. 
Id. at 486 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
71 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Dr. Golde never asked Moore for express consent to the removal of his 
blood and tissue.72 However, at the close of seven years, Dr. Golde asked 
him to sign a consent form giving UCLA permission to use the withdrawn 
tissue for research purposes.73 Dr. Golde presented the consent form as a 
mere formality and Moore signed.74 However, Moore became suspicious 
when, after he later declined to sign a similar consent form, Dr. Golde 
offered to pay for his airfare and accommodations at a ritzy Beverly Hills 
Moore hired a lawyer.76 During his investigation, the lawyer 
discovered that Dr. Golde had obtained a patent on the cell line developed 
from Moore's cells.77 He learned that Dr. Golde had a contract with a 
biotechnology company that gave Dr. Golde stocks and financing worth 
more than $3.5 million to "commercially develop" and "scientifically 
investigate" the cell line.78 The market value of the cell line was predicted 
to reach $3 billion.79 Upon learning of the deception, Moore said that he 
felt "violated for dollars," "invaded," and Moore sued Dr. Golde 
for con~ersion.~' His lawsuit was dismissed by the trial court, reinstated by 
the court of appeals, and finally made its way to the California Supreme 
Court. 
Over strongly worded dissents, the majority refused to extend 
conversion liability to Moore's situation. It acknowledged that the tort of 
conversion would protect individual autonomy.82 However, the court 
" Michelle J. Burke & Victoria M. Schmidt, Old Remedies in the Biotechnology Age: 
Moore v. Regents I, MAG. INTELL. PROP. & TECH., Oct. 27, 2006, available at 
h~://www.piercelaw.edu/risk~vol3/summer/mo0re.h~. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. During that trip, Moore told Dr. Golde that he no longer had a place to stay in Los 
Angeles. Id. Moore became suspicious because Dr. Golde seemed "overeager" to pay for 
his accommodations, Dr. Golde made numerous attempts to obtain his signature on the 
consent form, and Dr. Golde was evasive when asked about any commercial use of his 
tissue. Id. 
76 ANDREWS &NELKIN, supra note 5, at 27. 
77 Id. at 28. The lawyer discovered this by reading an article published by Dr. Golde in 
Science describing the patent. Id. 
78 Skloot, supra note 64, at 2. 
79 Id. 
80 ANDREWS &NELKIN, supra note 5, at 28. 
His complaint stated thirteen causes of action, including lack of informed consent and 
breach of fiduciaty duty. Burke & Schmidt, supra note 72. 
82 See Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479,494 ICal. 1990) ("To be sure, 
the threat of liability for conversion might help to enforce patients' rights indirectly. This is 
because physicians might be able to avoid liability by obtaining patients' consent, in the 
broadest possible terms, to any conceivable subsequent research use of excised cells."). 
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decided against extending the theory to the medical research context 
because recognition would "create[] disincentives to the conduct of socially 
beneficial research'' that was "of importance to all of society . . . ."83 In SO 
holding, the court touted protection of "innocent researchers" despite the 
fact that Dr. Golde was not an innocent researcher acting in good faith.84 
Invocation of the innocent researcher ideal demonstrates the 
sometimes intimate relationship between the social benefit and idealization 
biases. The entire court agreed that Dr. Golde deliberately failed to obtain 
consent in order to mine Moore's body for cells in furtherance of Dr. 
Golde's financial interests. Despite this, the majority's primary concern 
was to avoid stymieing socially useful 
The Moore decision marks an unwillingness to recognize insults to 
human dignity that result from intentional fiaud. What appears to 
distinguish the Moore case from a typical assault or fraud case,86 
customarily subject to the criminal sanction, is the potential social benefit 
of the researcher's conduct and a fear that recognition of Moore's interests 
would stymie future research. 
Researchers engaged in intentional misconduct have taken advantage 
of social benefit bias, intentionally or unintentionally, to deflect attention 
83 Id. at 494, 487. See also id. at 499 (noting that the majority was concerned that ''the 
imposition of liability for conversion will impede medical research by innocent scientists 
who use the resources of existing cell repositories" but that this was "a factual setting not 
presented here. . . .") (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting); see also id. at 513 n.14 
(Mosk, J., dissenting) ("On this record the majority's solicitude for the protection of 
'innocent parties' seems ironic. The complaint is replete with factual allegations . . . to the 
effect that defendants repeatedly lied to Moore about their commercial exploitation of his 
tissue."). For further commentary on the Moore case, see Michelle Bourianoff Bray, 
Personalizing Personalty: Toward a Property Right in Human Bodies, 69 TEX. L. REV. 209, 
233-239 (1990); Dillon, supra note 57, at 631-32. 
84 Moore, 793 P.2d at 497. 
85 The court did allow Mr. Moore to proceed on his claim of violation of informed 
consent. However, this remedy is illusory for individuals, such as Moore, who do not suffer 
actual harm. See Krause, supra note 48, 366-67; Morreim, Litigation in Clinical Research, 
supra note 5, at 480 ("[A] number of scholars have recommended that serious deficiencies of 
Informed consent be deemed a distinct dignitary tort."); Morris, supra note 5, at 330-3l; 
Sh~ltz, supra note 5, at 225. But see Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
136, 152 (1992) ("Courts are beginning to compensate for infringements of the 
decisionmaking process, even if the tangible injury is not one that the law recognizes."). 
86 No criminal charges were ever brought against Dr. Golde. Dr. Golde's actions are 
similar to routinely prosecuted assaults. To make this determination, this Article refers to 
the hfodel Penal Code because state statutes differ in their definitions of crimes. An 
"assault" OCCurs when an actor "knowingly . . . causes bodily injury to another . . . ." MODEL 
8 21 1.1 (1962). "Bodily injury" includes physical pain, Id. 9 2 10.0(2). m e n  
Dr. Cr0lde performed medical procedures on Mr. Moore for seven years without hls 
pemssion, he caused physical pain, and he was aware that physical pain was 
to occur. Id. 8 2.02(2)(b)(ii) (defining "knowingly"). 
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away from their bad acts, demonize the victim, and shape public opinion. 
They have become "availability entrepreneurs"87 who can package events to 
benefit from social benefit bias. For example, in defending against 
accusations that his surreptitious mining of Moore's body was for his own 
financial benefit, Dr. Golde stated: "If there is economic gain, it will be to 
the people of ~al i fornia ."~~ Dr. Golde's attorney described Moore to others 
as "an ingrate."89 "Golde saved Moore's life. . . . 'Most people would 
embrace the doctor with all the gratitude they have."'90 One newspaper 
reported, "Moore's suit has raised the passions of the scientific community, 
which warns that if he is successful he will strike a blow against future 
medical re~earch."~' It is not surprising, then, that the general public, who 
stand to reap the benefits of research, are affected. As one letter to the 
editor stated: 
While I am not given to emotional outbursts over the numerous atrocities we 
humans seem hellbent on committing against one another, I was compelled to 
comment on the article "Medical Community Rocked by Tissue-Ownership Battle" 
[Jan. 81. Instead of hoping the medical community might one day save a life with 
their research, it appears John Moore and his lawyers have regressed to the ultimate in 
greed and self-degradation. While not always a staunch supporter of many of today's 
medical advances and research tactics, I nonetheless believe these advances will 
ultimately benefit mankind in the long run. The only hope I was left with after 
reading this article was that the research conducted on Mr. Moore's spleen would one 
day prove vital and essential to extending the lives of Mr. Moore and his l a ~ e r s ,  and 2 
that they would be denied this life-extending help solely for financial reasons. 
Hints of social benefit bias can also be seen in the failure to 
acknowledge systematically and consistently the history of research 
misconduct that accompanies many important medical advances, 
procedures, and products. For example, Dr. James Marion Sims is 
recognized as the "father of American gynecology" and revered as a 
benefactor of women, having opened the first hospital in the nation for the 
care of women in New York City and dedicated his career to the treatment 
87 Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Apprmch to Law 
and Economics, in BEHAV~ORAL L W AND ECONOMRS, supru note 13, at 13,38. 
*' Robert Reinhold, Ruling Raises Fear ofResearch Curbs, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1988, at 
15. 
89 Frank Swoboda, It Was My Spleen, and Now It Could Be Anywhere, WASH. PCJST, Jan. 
26, 1988, at HE10 (statement of Anthony Murray, attorney). 
Id. 
Id. 
92 Diane M. Burrows, Letter to the Editor, John Moore 1s Spleen, WASH. POST. Jan. f 4, 
1989, at A22. 
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of disorders.93 Hospitals carry his name, and marble monuments 
bearing his likeness and accolades stand in prominent l ~ c a t i ~ n ~ . "  
Very rarely, however, does anyone acknowledge the history of his 
abuse of female slaves, which formed the basis of his extensive knowledge. 
In the 1840s, Dr. Sims performed surgeries on enslaved girls and women in 
an attempt to perfect an operation to treat white women suffering from a 
painful vaginal condition. He performed excruciatingly pa in l l  surgery on 
his captives to create the condition, without the use of anesthesia, and 
forced them to take turns restraining each other as he made incisions, since 
other doctors could not stomach their '&bone-chilling shrieks."95 This is how 
he perfected the procedure, published his results in a prestigious medical 
journal, and became known as the "father of American gynecology,"96 
Importantly, this observation is not meant to condemn the use of the 
knowledge he gained (this Article offers no opinion on that question), but 
rather to point out that the silence regarding his methods is perhaps the 
result of a desire to enjoy the h i t s  of his labor without the constant 
reminder of the methods used to obtain them. A similar phenomenon is 
present in the ongoing debate over the morality of utilizing the medical 
knowledge obtained from the torture of concentration camp victims by the 
~ a z i s . ~ ~  
In conclusion, both idealization bias and social benefit bias may 
explain why researchers engaged in misconduct escape punishment.98 They 
93 HARRIET A. WASHINGTON, MEDICAL APARTHEID: THE DARK HISTORY OF MEDICAL 
EXPERIMENTATION ON BLACK AMERICANS FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 1, b1 
(Doubleday 2006) (2006). 
94 Id. at 1. 
95 Id. at 65. 
96 Id. at 66. 
97 George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin, Introduction to THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE 
NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 24, at 3,5 (citations omitted); see also Alan C. Nixon, gthe 
Data's Good, Use It-Regardless of the Source, THE SCIENTIST, Nov. 14, 1988, at 8 
(defending the use of Nazi data). 
98 Researchers are often prosecuted for filing false claims with the government under the 
mail and wire fraud statutes. See 18 U.S.C. 8 1001 (2006) (false claims); 18 U.S.C. 5 1343 
(2006) (wire fraud); 18 U.S.C. 8 1341 (2006) (mail fraud); see, e.g., United States ex rel. 
Cantekin v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 192 F.3d 402 (3d Cir. 1999) (same); United States ex rel. 
Berge v. Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453 (4th Cir. 1998) (same); United States ex rel. Chandler 
v. Hektoen Inst. for Med. Research, 118 F. supp. 2d 902 (N.D. 111. 2000) (same); United 
States v. Univ. of Cal., 912 F. Supp. 868 (D. Md. 1995) (same); United States v. Breuning, 
No. K-88-0135 (D. Md. Sept. 19, 1988) (cited in BratiSlav Stankovic, Pub Fiction: 
Rdections on Scientific Misconduct, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 975, 985 (2004)) (false claims); 
United States. v. Keplinger, 776 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1985) (mail fraud). These prosecutions 
Present m h e r  evidence of the social benefit bias. Some of these prosecutions occur in cases 
where researchers falsify efficacy data during the course of research. See, e.g., United States 
v. 740 F.2d 734 (9th Cir. 1984) (involving researchers who made false statements 
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are not viewed as criminals deserving of punishment. In Part 111 below, this 
Article begins a discussion on whether criminal punishment is appropriate 
for researcher misconduct. It does so by exploring the expressive harms 
that can result when an identifiable group of culpable actors are not 
punished through use of the criminal sanction. 
111. THE IMPORTANCE OF CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT 
Punishing culpable researchers would send a clear message: violations 
of autonomy and dignity are wrong whether or not they take place in the 
context of socially beneficial research.99 But that begs the question-what 
is punishment? This Article subscribes to the familiar view that what 
distinguishes punishment from other penalties is that punishments express 
moral condemnation.loO According to philosopher Joel Feinberg's well- 
known formulation, punishment is a ''conventional device for the 
expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of 
disapproval and reprobation, on the part either of the punishing 
authority . . . or of those 'in whose name' the punishment is infli~ted,"'~' 
Under this definition, a necessary condition of punishment is that it 
expresses censure, judgment, and disapproval in a socially conventional 
manner. 
Viewed in this way, punishment is not necessarily limited to the 
criminal sanction. If other penalties are understood to carry similar 
messages of denunciation and disapproval, they too could constitute 
punishment, Subpart A scrutinizes the expressive meaning of criminal 
punishment. Subpart B then considers whether alternative sanctions carry 
the same expressive meaning as the criminal sanction, and concludes that 
they do not. 
concerning efficacy of investigational drugs); Beverly Merz, Muny Address Tu.sk qf 
Preventing Research Fraud, 260 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 201 1,201 1 (1988) (discussing the case 
of Dr. Breuning, Ph.D., who plead guilty to providing fafalse efficacy data to the National 
Institute of Mental Health). Such misconduct places society at risk because the tested 
product may be, in fact, unsafe. However, the failure to prosecute cases in which individuab 
are injured can be explained by the fact that the harm to the individual subject arguably leads 
to better data, resulting in a safer product. 
99 Galanter and Luban refer to this as "norm projection." Marc Galantet & David Luban. 
Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393. 1429 
(1993). They argue that "an important aim of punishment is to dramatize publicly that legal 
norms are seriously intended. That is, punishment prevents offenses by norm projection and 
norm reinforcement as well as by deterrence." Id. 
" See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment. in Doixci & 
DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIB~LITY 98 (1970); Henty M. Hart, Jr., The 
Aims ofthe Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 40 1,404 f 1958). 
lo' FEJNBERG, supra note 100, at 98 {emphasis added). 
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A. WHAT CRIMINAL SANCTIONS EXPRESS 
How a society conventionally expresses censure is important. For 
example, Dan Kahan argues that verbally castigating a wrongdoer could be 
considered punishment if social norms within the community make it 
appropriately condemnatory.102 In our society, the criminal sanctionlo3 is 
viewed, uncontroversially, as the most serious statement of moral 
blameworthiness. In his famous treatise, Henry Hart asserted that what 
differentiates criminal punishment from the civil remedy is "the judgment 
of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its 
imposition."'04 The criminal sanction is the socially conventional method 
for expressing public censure,lo5 and is well understood in this society as a 
way for the state to condemn an act and to disavow it.Io6 Use of the 
criminal sanction may not be the only way to punish, or the best way, but in 
our society, it is the usual way.'07 
One feature of the sanction that makes it a unique method of 
expressing moral censure is the stigma that attaches to the individual. As 
one commentator describes it: "In modern criminal law, the stigma of a 
criminal sanction has become a special kind of remedy because of its 
burdensome and sometimes destructive consequences for the incli~idual."'~~ 
The stigma is not limited to a conviction. The state's decision to charge an 
individual also carries meaning, for it expresses that the accused probably 
deserves moral censure because his acts justify placing him at risk of a 
conviction and its attendant consequences. This explains the feelings of 
shame and humiliation that often accompany a criminal charge. 
102 Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U .  CHI.  L. REV. 591,600 
(1996). 
103 In this Article, the phrase "the criminal sanction" or "criminal punishment" are used 
to refer to the act of charging someone with an offense as well as any resulting conviction 
and consequences, including imprisonment, fines, probation, or community service. 
104 Hart, supra note 100, at 404. Others have also recognized the special nature of 
criminal punishment. See, e.g., Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The ~iddleground 
Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1808 (1992) ("The principal 
paradigmatic purpose of the criminal law-the reason for invoking criminal law rather than 
some alternative sanctioning system-is punishment."). 
' 05  FEINBERG, supra note 100, at 98. 
106 Id. at 102. 
107 I have paraphrased Hugo Bedau here. See Hugo Adam Bedau, Feinberg's Liberal 
T h e o ~  of Punishment, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 103, 125 (2001) ("'Punishment. . . might be 
d e ~ ~ e d  by the criminal only because it is the customary way of expressing the resentment 
or reprobation he 'has coming.' Not, mind you, the only way, or the best way-just the 
usual wav."). 
- ,  
lox Mann, supra note 104, at 1809. 
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Furthermore, the criminal brand continues to express condemnation 
long after it is imposed. Except in rare circurn~tances,~~~ a person convicted 
of a crime must, for the remainder of his life, inform others of his 
culpability and blameworthiness by disclosing his conviction on 
employment, education, housing, and licensing applications. A conviction 
also has political, economic, and social consequences.'10 In many 
instances, it results in the loss of the rights to vote and to carry a weapon, 
and of the ability to obtain public benefits, live in certain neighborhoods, 
and engage in certain types of employment. These are just a few collateral 
consequences of a conviction. 
When the state utilizes the criminal sanction, it "goes on record" and 
"testiflies] to the recognition" that the conduct in question is wrong and the 
offender is deserving of condemnation and reprobation."' The use of the 
sanction "tells the world that [the offender] had no right to do what he did, 
that he was on his own in doing it, that his government does not condone 
that sort of thing."'12 Through criminal punishment, the state vindicates the 
victim's value or worth.'13 The victim has been wronged, and the state is 
stepping up to defend her honor, so to speak.l14 
The state's failure to utilize this powerful method of condemnation is 
also expressive. "What a community chooses to punish and how severely 
tells us what (or whom) it values and how much."115 When the state 
permits an identifiable group to commit criminal acts without punishment, 
it sends a message of official complicity and solidarity with the ~ffender,"~ 
'09 Juvenile adjudications and expungements are exceptions, although even these 
protections are not always perfect. See Carrie T. Hollister, The Impossible Predicament o f  
Gina Grant, 44 UCLA L. REV. 913 (1997) (discussing sealed-record statutes for juveniles 
and their problems); Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate: In Praise qf a 
Forgotten Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM Urn. L.J. 1705 (2003) (discussing 
expungements). 
"' DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRJMINAL LAW 6 (2008) 
(citing Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on 
Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REV. 153 (1999)). 
"' FEINBERG, supra note 100, at 103. 
"' Id. at 102. 
See Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theou ofRefribution, in RETR~BUT~VISM AND ITS 
CRITICS 1, 15 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992). 
'I4 Lawrence Friedman, Essay in Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HAW. J.L. 
& Pue. POL? 833, 842 (2000) ("[Tlhe commission of an act the community, through its 
laws, deems wrong should be met with disapprobation for the sake of the victim and the sake 
of the community."). 
l i 5  Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Ecmmic Anahsi.7 of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 609,615 (1998). 
"6 JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 13 1 ( 3  988) ("[Wle 
would be accomplices in the crime if we failed to punish its perpetrator, because we would 
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approval of the conduct,117 and disassociation from the victim. AS a result, 
wrongdoers may believe that they are entitled to act as they did. 
Punishment is meant to humble the offender, to make him feel some inner 
experience of humiliation and shame,l18 in order to " a d  or counter7' the 
message sent by his conduct.11g Letting the offender "get away with it7' 
may lead to further bad acts as offenders and potential offenders come to 
believe that their treatment of the victim or class of victims is 
permissible.120 
The problems associated with failing to punish are apparent in the 
treatment of a well-known and respected researcher and professor, Dr. 
Albert Kligman. In 1951, Dr. Kligman, a professor of dermatology at the 
University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine, was called to Holmesburg 
Prison to treat an outbreak of athlete's foot.I2l Describing how he felt when 
he first arrived at the prison, Dr. Kligman exclaimed, "All I saw before me 
were acres of skin. It was like a fmner seeing a fertile field for the first 
time."122 For the next twenty-five years, Dr. Kligman conducted 
experiments on prisoners123 for the benefit of at least thirty-three major 
pharmaceutical and cosmetic companies, including Merck, DuPont, and 
Johnson & ~ 0 h n s o n . l ~ ~  He also created his own company to personally 
profit fiom his research125 and became a millionaire after he created the 
anti-acne medication Retin-A as a result of his research.'26 
The prisoners were not fully or accurately informed about the nature of 
the experiments conducted on them.127 As one explained, "We were never 
-- 
be condoning the evidence it gave us of the relative worth of victim and offender. . . we 
would be acquiescing in the message it sent about the victim's inferiority."). 
FEINBERG, supra note 100, at 101-03. 
Hampton, supra note 113, at 1,15. 
MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 116, at 124-28, 130. "To inflict on a wrongdoer 
something comparable to what he inflicted on the victim is to master him in the way that he 
mastered the victim. The score is even. . . . Hence the lex talionis calls for a wrongdoer to 
be subjugated in a way that symbolizes his being the victim's equal." Id. at 128. 
120 See also Hampton, supra note 113, at 6 (explaining how crime demeans a victim's 
worth); 4 Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of 
Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1679 (1992) (explaining that allowing the propagation 
of books that assert the superiority of one race or sex can be dangerous because people may 
"come to believe [their] assertions of superiority" and act on those beliefs). 
121 WOLFGANG WEYERS, THE ABUSE OF MAN: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF DUBIOUS 
MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION 426 (2003). 
122 WASHINGTON, supra note 93, at 249. 
123 WEYERS, supra note 121, at 427. 
124 WASHINGTON, supra note 93, at 249. 
WEYERS, supra note 121, at 543-44. 
126 WASHINGTON, supra note 93, at 249. 
12' WEYERS, supra note 121, at 435. 
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told what was going on. We never had [a copy ofj anything we signed."12' 
One of Dr. Kligman's students acknowledged that "uninformed patients 
were the mle,"129 and Dr. Kligman admitted, "It was years before the 
authorities knew that I was conducting various studies on prisoner 
volunteers . . . . No one asked me what I was doing. It was a wonderful 
time."130 
Dr. Kligman faced no lasting repercussions for his conduct, even after 
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) discovered his questionable 
practices. The FDA initiated an investigation after Dr. Kligman published 
an article that described covering inmates' torsos with an industrial solvent 
that the FDA had banned from human tests.l3l The FDA investigation 
revealed additional questionable practices.'32 Consequently, the agency 
banned Dr. Kligman from receiving and testing investigational drugs on 
human subjects.133 This was only the second time in its history that the 
FDA used this sanction.134 However, prominent doctors and researchers 
spoke out in his defense and pressured the FDA to reverse its de~is i0n. l~~ 
Less than a month later, the FDA gave in to the pressure.136 The agency's 
capitulation sent a clear message to Dr. Kligman and the research 
community that his actions were condoned. 
Dr. Kligman received that message. He recently stated, "My view is 
that shutting the prison experiments down was a big mistake . . . . I still 
don't see there having been anything wrong with what we were doing."137 
He is still praised for his prison work13' and currently sits on the ethics 
----- -
128 WASHINGTON, supra note 93, at 245 (quoting Jesse Williams's statement during a 
2004 interview with Washington). 
12' WEYERS, supra note 121, at 435. 
130 WASHINGTON, supra note 93, at 251. Problematically, at the time of these 
experiments, the United States had already adopted guidelines for research that required 
informed consent. See WEYERS, supra note 121, at 381. 
13' WASHINGTON, supra note 93, at 250; WEYERS, supra note 121, at 556. The results 
were published in the Journal of the American Medical Association in 1965. WEYERS, supra 
note 12 1, at 556. 
'32 His experiments included burning his captives with radiation, immersing their body 
parts in tanning chemicals, and applying acid to their scrotums until the skin fefl away, 
WASHINGTON, supra note 93, at 244. Many of the victims still bear physical scars. Id. 
133 WASHINGTON, supra note 93, at 250; WEYERS, supra note 121, at55S. 
134 WEYERS, supra note 121, at 558-59. 
'35 Id. at 559-60. 
136 Id. at 558,560; WASHINGTON, supra note 93, at 250. 
'37 Ian Urbina, Panel Suggests Using Inmates in Drug Trials, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13,2006, 
at 1, av&ble of h t t p : / / ~ . n y t i m e s . c o m / 2 0 0 6 / 0 8 / 1 3 / ~ ~ / 1 3 1 .  
13' WEYERS, supra note 121, at 616. 
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committee at the University of Pennsylvania medical school139 where he is 
an emeritus professor of dermatology. 140 
The failure to punish creates expressive harms. "A person suffers 
expressive harm when she is treated according to principles that express 
negative or inappropriate attitudes toward her."141 When researchers are 
permitted to commit criminal acts against individuals without punishment, 
it sends the message that research subjects can be harmed to serve the ends 
of research. The state's failure to act makes this message all the more 
powerful because "the state is--or at least purports to be-an impartial 
agent of morality, with greater capacity to recognize the moral facts than 
any involved individual citizen."142 To paraphrase John Braithwaite, what 
is needed is punishment that maximizes the sense of shame and 
communicates the message that crime in human experimentation "is as 
abhorrent to the community as crime in the streets."'43 
B. SCRUTINIZING THE ALTERNATIVES 
If punishments are "sanctions . . . expressing public reprobation and 
moral censure of the harm-causing wrongdoer,"144 then civil liability and 
institutional penalties may not constitute punishment. This Subpart argues 
that these commonly used altematives to the criminal sanction in the human 
experimentation context are not conventionally understood as expressing 
moral condemnation as dramatically and unequivocally as does criminal 
punishment.145 
1. Civil Liability 
Generally, civil liability is viewed as a means to compensate an injured 
victim and return her to the status quo ante, as opposed to a punitive 
139 Id. 
See Urbina, supra note 137. 
141 Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General 
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503,1527-28 (2000). Expressive harms can occur whether 
or not communication is intended. Id. at 1529-30. "An expressive harm . . . results from the 
ideas or attitudes expressed through a governmental action, rather than from the more 
tangible or material consequences the action brings about. . . . [Tlhe very meaning they 
convey demonstrates inappropriate respect. . . ." Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, 
Expressive Harms, 'Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District 
Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483,506-07 (1993). 
14' Hampton, supra note 1 13, at 1693. 
'43 JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 143 (1989). 
JOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING 12 (1988). 
145 Kahan, supra note 102, at 593. My only argument is that today, these alternative 
sanctions do not carry the same expressive message as criminal punishment. I do not 
express an opinion about whether other sanctions, such as shaming, are better alternatives. 
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device.146 Unlike criminal punishment, tort liability is not reserved for 
culpable actors; even accidental conduct can result in a compensatory 
damages award.147 Setting aside the issue of punitive damages for a 
moment, compensatory damages do not express moral censure in the same 
way as criminal punishment, and thus do not carry the same stigma, 
Whether a harm is the result of an accident, negligence, or an intentional 
act, the amount of compensatory damages remains the same. 
Additional factors explain why the social meaning of civil liability is 
different from that of the criminal sanction. First, criminal defendants are 
afforded constitutional procedural protections such as proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt and the right to counsel. The absence of such procedural 
protections in civil proceedings expresses the seriousness of criminal 
punishment relative to civil liability.14' Second, a finding of civil liability is 
not accompanied by the risk of imprisonment or the collateral consequences 
of a criminal conviction. Accordingly, civil defendants are not humbled to 
the same extent as are criminal defendants. Criminal punishment expresses 
blame and reprobation, a message that is largely absent from an award of 
'46 See Mann, supra note 104, at 1799 (stating that the paradigmatic distinction between 
the criminal and civil law is that "the criminal law is distinguished by its punitive purposes, 
its high procedural barriers to conviction, its concern with the blameworthiness of the 
defendant, and its particularly harsh sanctions. In contras.t, the civil law is defined as a 
compensatory scheme, focusing on damage rather than on blameworthiness, and providing 
less severe sanctions and lower procedural safeguards than the criminal law,"). This is not to 
say that the civil remedy can never result in opprobrium. Rather, the criminal conviction 
results in stigma more often than the civil remedy. See, e.g., Lawrence Friedman, In Defense 
of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL? 833, 854 (2000) 
("Notwithstanding the retributive character of some aspects of civil liability (a punitive 
damage award, for example), only criminal liability is understood against the background of 
social norms, codified by the criminal law, as conveying the particular moral condemnation 
that expressive retribution contemplates."); see also J. Morris Clark, Civil and Criminal 
Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379, 
407 (1976) ("One might conceptualize the difference between civilly and criminally labeled 
penalties by stating that most people see in civil penalties an element of deterrence, but not a 
very strong element of retribution or moral condemnation."). But see Galanter & Luban, 
supra note 99, at 1404-07 (arguing that the public often associates the civil sanction with 
punishment). There are other civil remedies such as injunctions, forfeitures, and specific 
performance. However, this Article only discusses compensatory and punitive damages 
because they are most often sought in cases involving mistreatment of human subjects. 
'47 One instance in which tort liability carries a stigma is when it is brought in response 
to a failure to convict the defendant of a crime. However, even in such cases, the stigma is 
connected to the criminal sanction and is viewed as a substitute for the failure to obtain the 
desired criminal conviction. For example, to the extent that there was a stigma attached to 
the award of civil (wrongful death) damages against O.J. Simpson, it is likely associated 
with the failure to convict him in his criminal murder trial. 
14' See Carol S, Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the 
Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775,808 (1 997). 
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compensatory damages. In fact, far from being humbled or stigmatized, 
compensatory damages express to wrongdoers that they are privileged to 
act, subject only to possible payment later in the form of damages.ldg Thus, 
the compensatory damages remedy allows wrongdoers to convert property 
rules into liability rules at wi11.l~~ Finally, even the players in the criminal 
justice system recognize the symbolic-and practical-difference between 
a judgment of guilt and a finding of liability.151 Although compensatory 
damages may sometimes express condemnation, they are not the socially 
conventional way of doing so, 
The bulk of my discussion thus far has addressed the compensatory 
damages component of tort liability. However, an award of punitive 
damages is also possible. Punitive damages have been described as quasi- 
criminal punishment and are reserved for culpable actors.lS2 The Supreme 
Court recognized that "[ulnlike compensatory damages,. . . punitive 
damages are specifically designed to exact punishment in excess of actual 
harm to make clear that the defendant's misconduct was especially 
reprehensible. Hence, there is a stigma attached to an award of punitive 
damages that does not accompany a purely compensatory award."lS3 
Punitive damages are a conventional device for expressing 
condemnation. However, the relative strength of that condemnation is 
weak compared to the condemnation expressed by the criminal sanction. 
Punitive damages carry neither the possibility of imprisonment nor the 
collateral consequences of criminal punishment. Moreover, punitive 
damages are the subject of negative portrayals in the media as a result of the 
tort reform movement.154 The archetype stories of frivolous lawsuits that 
are rewarded by out-of-control juries paint punitive damages awards as 
149 See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1550 (1984) ("[Ilf 
crimes were priced, rather than sanctioned, people would be permitted to commit crimes 
provided that they paid the price."). 
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1124-27 (1972). 
151 As a criminal defense lawyer, I often attempted to negotiate a civil settlement in lieu 
of criminal prosecution. 
152 Unlike compensatory damages, punitive damages require proof of a culpable mens 
rea, such as malice. See Galanter & Luban, supra note 99, at 1407; Dan Markel, Retributive 
Damages: A Theoy of Punitive Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 94 CORNELL . REV. 
239 (2009). 
. , 
153 See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 55 (1991) (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting); see also WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (5th 
ed. 1984) (describing punitive damages as an "anomalous" situation demonstrating that ''the 
ideas underlying the criminal law have invaded the field of torts"). 
154see, e.g., Am. Tort Reform Ass'n, Punitive Damages Refom 
http:/Jwww.atra.org/show/7343 (last visited Feb. 2,2009) (discussing problems with punitive 
damages awards from the perspective of an organization advocating tort reform). 
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abuses of the legal system.15' In other words, public perception of punitive 
damages as disproportionate punishment has diluted their condemnatory 
power. Finally, courts can reduce punitive damages awards at their 
di~creti0n.l~~ If reduced, the resulting damages may no longer humble and 
shame the offender. Indeed, the reduction may even vindicate the 
~ r 0 n ~ d o e r . l ~ ~  
Assuming that punitive damages do constitute punishment, there 
remains an important use for criminal sanctions. Culpable acts injure 
potential victims as well as actual victims.'5g Potential victims may fear 
being subjected to future harms.15' Unlike criminal sanctions, punitive 
damages cannot be awarded to protect future Criminal 
sanctions, on the other hand, punish wrongdoers for injury to actual victims 
as well as injury to society as a whole. 
In sum, compensatory damages do not express punishment, and the 
social meaning of punitive damages is at best ambiguous. Use of the civil 
sanction, as opposed to criminal punishment, expresses that the offender's 
behavior does not deserve denunciation by the state. Thus, the state's 
failure to charge researchers for crimes expresses an inappropriate attitude 
towards the victim and the offender when compared to its willingness to 
charge people with crimes for committing similar acts outside of the 
medical research context. Arguably, these messages are exacerbated by the 
15' See, e.g., Galanter & Luban, supra note 99, at 1409-11; Legalzoom, Top Ten 
Frivolous Lawsuits, http://www.legalzoom.com~legal-articles/top-ten-frivolous-lawsuits.html 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2009) ("We've all heard the one about the woman who spilled scalding 
coffee and successfully sued McDonald's."). 
15' See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (finding punitive 
damages award with a 500:l ratio to compensatory damages excessive). Although the Court 
has not placed constitutional limits on the ratio between actual and potential harm, it has 
indicated that punitive damages awards that exceed a single-digit ratio with compensatory 
damages will likely offend due process. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 
U.S. 408 (2003). Punitive damages awards have been reduced by courts in medical research 
cases. See, e.g., Heinrich v. Sweet, 308 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2002). 
157 See Hampton, supra note 120, at 1687-89 (discussing how the reduction in large 
punitive damages awards may express the relative superiority of the offenders over those 
injured). 
See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 116, at 125 11.19 (stating that some moral 
wrongs injure not only one individual, but society as a whole); Jerome Ball, Inferrelatiom of 
Criminal Law and Torts: 11,443 COLUM. L. REV. 967,969 (1943) ("[lln torts, 'effects' almost 
invariably include actual damage to some person, whereas in crimes, damage is not 
essential-instead the notion of a 'social harm,' supplies the requirement there." (citation 
omitted)). 
159 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 58-71 (1974) (arguing that the 
state is justified in establishing public institutions of criminal justice with respect to acts 
which create a generalized sense of fear affecting persons other than actual victims). 
Ih0 See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007). 
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too-frequent use of the criminal sanction as a normative response to 
wrongful conduct. I do not advocate overcriminalization. However, 
legislative eagerness to propose and pass new criminal laws and the use of 
tough-on-crime rhetoric sends a message that the criminal sanction is the 
only means of expressing societal condemnation. Consequently, 
overcriminalization has constructed a social reality that only criminal 
sanctions are capable of truly punishing offenders and vindicating victims. 
2. Institutional Sanctions 
Institutional sanctions also provide a means for protecting against 
misconduct in human experimentation. Both the FDA and the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) play a role in protecting human subjects.l6' FDA 
regulations govern clinical trials of drugs and devices for FDA approval. 
Researchers who fail to comply with FDA regulations, such as informed 
consent requirements,162 may lose their entitlement to work with 
investigational 
The NIH protects human subjects by conditioning its coveted research 
grants. Recipients of NIH funds must sign an assurance of compliance with 
human subject protection rules, including mandatory informed consent 
 procedure^.'^^ Failure to comply with these requirements can result in 
withdrawal of current fbnding and ineligibility for future grants.165 
Institutional sanctions can cause embarrassment, stigmatization, 
reputational losses, and even affect a researcher's ability to work in his 
chosen field. However, as serious as these consequences may be, they do 
161 "Compliance with these parts is intended to protect the rights and safety of subjects 
involved in [such] investigations . . . ." 21 C.F.R. (j 50.1 (2008). For a general history of 
existing regulations protecting human subjects, see Alvino, supra note 24, at 895-909. 
'62 21 C.F.R. (j 50.20. 
163 21 C.F.R. (j 312.70 (2008). This revocation can be permanent, but is rarely 
employed. See 07Reilly, supra note 5, at 345. The FDA can also issue a temporary or 
lifetime bar from participating in the dmg industry. 21 U.S.C. (j(j 335a, 335b (2006) 
(applying debarment only after a researcher has a qualifying conviction for a felony). The 
FDA maintains a list of individuals and firms barred from participating in the drug industry, 
and publishes this list in the federal register. FDA, Disqualified/Restricted/Assuran~es List 
for Clinical Investigators, http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance-ref- 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2009); see also Tamar Nordenberg, Inside FDA: Barring People from 
the Drug Industry, FDA CONSUMER MAG., Mar. 1997, http://ww~.fda.~ov/fdac/features/ 
1997f297-debar.html (discussing debarment). 
164 Public Health Service Act (PHSA), 42 U.S.C. $9 201-300 (2000). The PHSA 
establishes uniform regulations on informed consent, 45 C.F.R. (j 46.101 (2008), and 
delineates oversight responsibilities to Institutional Review Boards, 21 C.F.R. (j 56.101 
(2008); see also 45 C.F.R. 8 46.103 (regulating the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the 
Department of Health and Human Services, and the FDA). 
165 See 45 C.F.R. (j 46.123. 
20091 WHEN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATIONIS CRIMINAL 117 
not necessarily express moral condemnation. Although an offender may 
feel punished when his privilege to work in an industry is withdrawn, 
institutional sanctions are not unambiguously punishment and can even be 
understood as purely remedial.'66 
The following hypothetical illustrates the notion that institutional 
sanctions are not punitive. Imagine a doctor who rapes his patient while 
she is under anesthesia. Rather than prosecuting this doctor, the state 
revokes his license. Most people would not consider this sanction a 
sufficient expression of moral blame. Furthermore, wrongdoers in many 
professional fields are simultaneously prosecuted and debarred from their 
chosen field. For example, the state often prosecutes lawyers who have 
already been disbarred. Thus, the failure to impose both criminal sanctions 
and professional sanctions sends the message that researchers' misconduct 
is undeserving of the most serious ~ancti0n.l~~ 
3. An Example of the Expressive Failures ofAlternative Sanctions 
The death of Jesse Gelsinger during his participation in human subject 
research provides an example of how civil liability and institutional 
sanctions fail to send equivalent messages of blanleworthiness and moral 
culpability as criminal sanctions. Jessie died as a result of misconduct by 
the head researcher in the experiment. Despite the existence of criminal 
statutes prohibiting his conduct, the researcher was not prosecuted.168 This 
'" See Mann, supra note 104, at 1839 (arguing that monetary civil penalties over and 
above compensation are unambiguously punishment, while nonmonetary penalties are 
largely remedial). Some courts hold that the withdrawal of the privilege to work in a field is 
simply remedial. See, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 104 (1997) (""We have 
long recognized that 'revocation of a privilege voluntarily granted,' such as a debarment, 'is 
characteristically free of the punitive criminal element."' (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 
303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938))); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603,617 (1960) (explaining that 
while the individual is prohibited from further participation in the health care industry, this is 
"certainly nothing approaching the 'infamous punishment' of imprisonment"); United States 
v. Bizzell, 921 F.2d 263,267 (10th Cir. 1990) ("It is the clear intent of debarment to purge 
government programs of cormpt influences and to prevent improper dissipation of public 
funds. RemovaI of persons whose participation in those programs is detrimental to public 
purposes is remedial by definition."); Manocchio v. Sullivan, 768 F. Supp. 814, 817 (S.D. 
Fla. 1991) ("Disqualifying a person from participating in a social program or practicing a 
profession because of offensive activity is not punishment, if the past activity is such that the 
public would have an interest in excluding the offender."). 
167 The loss of federal funds or debarment may not prevent researchers from continuing 
to work in the same field. An additional shortcoming with NIH and FDA sanctions is that 
they only cover trials that are regulated by the FDA or receive federal funds. O'Reilly, 
supra note 5,  at 335-36. Half of the trials currently conducted in the United States are 
funded privately. Id. at 337. Legislation proposed in 1997 that would have called for the 
regulation of all clinical trials affecting interstate commerce failed to pass. Id. at 35 I n.2 19. 
16* See inza note 196. 
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case provides a useful lens through which to examine the expressive 
meaning of the failure to use criminal punishment. 
Eighteen-year-old Jesse Gelsinger suffered from a mild form of a rare 
metabolic disorder that affects the body's ability to break down ammonia.169 
He was diagnosed at age two and for the remaining sixteen years of his life 
successfully controlled his disease with a low-protein diet and drugs.170 
Jesse's treating physician told him about gene therapy trials conducted by 
the Institute for Human Gene Therapy at the University of Pennsylvania 
(IHGT)."' Dr. James Wilson, director of the IHGT, was the trial's sponsor, 
which made him responsible for ensuring compliance with the regulations 
governing human subject research, including informed ~ 0 n s e n t . l ~ ~  
Jesse and his father met with researchers at the IHGT to determine 
whether Jesse was an appropriate candidate for the study and to give 
informed consent,173 The researchers told the Gelsingers that the IHGT had 
achieved a "certain efficacy" with respect to the treatment of the disease.174 
Due to the efficacy information and the informed consent document, Jesse 
and his father believed that the risks of joining the study were 
Jesse enrolled in the trial in September of 1999. Four days later, he died. 
After Jesse's death, the FDA conducted an investigation that revealed 
that researchers had enrolled Jesse in the trial despite the fact that he did not 
properly qualify to participate in it.'76 The FDA m h e r  determined that the 
researchers "repeatedly or deliberately violated regulations governing the 
16' Complaint ld, 2, Gelsinger v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa., http:NsskPplaw.codlinks/ 
healthcare2.html (last visited Feb. 2,2009). 
"O Id. fl55-57. 
17' Gene therapies use specially created genetic material that is inserted into target cells 
with the intent to cure a genetically-based disease. Baram, supra note 24, at 255. There are 
currently approximately 500 gene therapy trials involving over 4000 human subjects with 
&ding from the NIH. Id. There are also some privately-financed studies approved by the 
FDA. Id. 
172 News Release, United States Attorney's Office, available at http://www.upenn.edu/ 
almanac/volumes/v5 lln2llgts.html [hereinafter USA0 News Release]. 
'73 Complaint, supra note 169, W 59-60. 
174 Id* ld, 61. According to the plaintiffs complaint, defendant Dr. Arthur Caplan, an 
ethical consultant to the research team, admitted after Jesse's death that "there was never any 
chance that anybody would benefit from these experiments. They [were] safe@ 
studies. . . . If you cured anybody, you'd publish it in a religious journal. It would be a 
miracle. [But tlhe researchers wouIdn't say that," Id. ld,? 43-44. 
'75 Id. 7 62. 
176 Jesse's blood ammonia levels on the day before he received the gene transfer 
exceeded the limit set out in the FDA protocol, but the researchers enrolled him anyway as a 
substitute for another volunteer who had dropped out. FDA Suspends Trials at Gene- 
Therapy Lab, CNN.COM, Jan. 22,2000, available at http://archives.cnn.com/2000/BEALT~~ 
01/221gene.therapy/. 
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proper conduct of clinical studies."177 These violations included modifying 
the FDA-approved informed consent document. For example, the 
researchers had removed information that monkeys injected with the virus 
had become ill or died.'78 Dr. Wilson and his research team had also 
ignored an FDA request to revise the informed consent document so that 
participants would be aware of serious side effects suffered by previous 
subjects.'79 As a result, neither Jesse nor his father was aware of these 
risks. According to Jesse's father: 
Jesse and I were told. . . that a prior patient, the patient before him, had shown a 
clinical improvement of [fifty] percent in her ability to eliminate ammonia from her 
system. . . . [After Jesse's death] I discovered that no efficacy was achieved at all in 
this patient. I had no idea there was no success in gene therapy before my son's 
participation in this. Nobody relayed that information to me. I was under the 
impression this worked . . . . I found out it was an experiment. 180 
The FDA found numerous additional violations, including failures to 
make required disclosures to the FDA, which may have brought the trial to 
a stop before Jesse enro~led.'~' Upon completing its investigation into 
Jesse's death, the FDA commenced administrative proceedings to 
disqualifl Dr. Wilson from conducting further clinical studies."' The 
177 Letter from Steven A. Masiello, Dep't of Health & Human Serv., to James M, 
Wilson, Inst, for Gene Therapy 1 (Nov. 30, 20QO), available at http://www.fda.gov/foi/ 
ni$oe/nlZi.pdf [hereinafter Initiation Letter] (providing "Notice of Initiation of 
Disqualification Proceeding"") 
17' WBYBRS, supra note 121, at 605; Complaint, supra note 169,q 61. 
'79 WEYERS, supra note 121, at 605 (citation omitted). Dr. Wilson failed to maintain 
adequate case histories of subjects tested with the investigational drugs. Id. 
I8O Gene Therapy: Is There Oversight,for Patient SSafty?: Hearing Befire the Subcomm. 
on Public Health of the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and Pension, 106th Cong 28, 
31 (2000) [hereinafter Gene Therapy Hearing]. 
According to the Chief of the FDA's Center for Biologics, "We probably would have 
made them stop the trial until we figured out what was going on." Id. Although the study's 
approved protocol required termination ofthe trial "if a single subjcct develops Grade I11 or 
higher toxicity," Dr. Wilson failed to terminate the study dcspite knowledge that five 
subjects had exhibited Grade 111 toxicity. Initiation Letter, supra note 177, at 2-4. In fact, he 
even hiled to document toxicity levels for numerous subjects. Id. Dr. Wilson failed to 
exclude people from the trial who did not meet the criteria for subjcct selection. ld at 5-8. 
A total of four ineligible people were entered into the study. Id. Dr. Wilson failed to 
monitor all the subjects as required by the protocol, id., and he frequently submitted 
misleading and inaccurate information to the independent overseeing body charged with 
ensuring compliance with the approved protocol. Re also did not report that two subjects 
had suffered serious reactions. FDA Suspends Trials at Gene-Therapy Lab, supra note 176. 
Furthermore, Dr. Wilson modified the trial's approved protocols without obtaining approval. 
Initiation Letter, supra note 177, at 8- 12. 
lg2 See Initiation Letter, supra note 177, at 1. 
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Government eventually settled a civil suit with the University of 
Pennsylvania for violations of the civil False Claims ~c t . ' "  
The settlement with the Government imposed a number of sanctions 
upon Dr. Wilson that may, upon cursory inspection, appear to express 
punishment. For five years, the settlement prohibits Dr. Wilson from 
serving as a sponsor in any FDA clinical trial and from conducting human 
subject research without the supervision of a monitor.la4 Additionally, for 
three years, the settlement prohibited him from conducting more than one 
experiment at a time.ls5 It also required him "to lecture and author an 
article on the lessons learned from this study [and] . . . to advocate for 
inclusion of any statements from those affected by the study, e.g., the 
Gelsinger 
Closer scrutiny of these responses to his misconduct, however, leads to 
the conclusion that they likely do not constitute punishment. The 
settlement does not permanently bar Dr. Wilson from serving as a trial 
sponsor or from conducting human subject research. Rather, during the 
period of restriction, the settlement not only allows him to serve in other 
capacities, but also permits him to conduct research on humans as long as a 
monitor is present.187 The requirement of a monitor may bruise the ego of 
someone of his stature. However, its insufficiency as punishment is 
demonstrated if we imagine similar treatment of the more common 
criminal. Imagine that a bank employee is guilty of embezzlement. Would 
183 USA0 News Release, supra note 172 (announcing that the University of 
Pennsylvania had agreed to pay $517,496). There was also an industry-wide response that 
could arguably protect future victims. The FDA and NIH jointly announced a new initiative, 
the Gene Therapy Clinical Trial Monitoring Plan, designed to increase the level of scrutiny 
by adding reporting requirements for study sponsors, and a series of Gene Transfer Safety 
Symposia designed to allow researchers to communicate with each other, share results about 
unexpected problems, and ensure that everyone knows the rules. See Larry Thompson, 
Human Gene Therapy: Harsh Lessons, High Hopes, FDA CONSUMER MAG., Sept.-Oct. 
2000, available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2000/50Oene.hl. The FDA 
launched random inspections in more than two dozen gene therapy trials nationwide and 
instituted new reporting requirements. Id. Finally, President Clinton announced more "new 
actions designed to ensure that individuals are adequately informed about the potential risks 
and benefits of participating in research. . . and steps designed to address the potential 
financial conflicts of interest faced by researchers." Id. President Clinton also stated in May 
2000 that he was sending a proposal for new legislation to Congress that would authorize 
civil sanctions for researchers and institutions found to be in violation of regulations 
governing clinical triaIs, which would give the FDA the power to fine researchers up to 
$250,000 and their institutions up to $1 million. Id. 
USAO News Release, supra note 172. 
185 Id. Dr. Wilson is also required to have a special monitor when conducting animal 
research that could influence the safety of human research participants. Id. 
ls6 Id. This Article does not deal with the other researchers involved. 
lS7 Id. 
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we believe that he was punished if, rather than facing criminal prosecution, 
he was assigned a monitor to work with him for the next few years to 
ensure that he does not attempt to embezzle more funds during that time 
period? A limitation on research functions more as a deterrent, or as a way 
to incapacitate, rather than as true punishment with its attendant message of 
moral blameworthine~s.'~~ Finally, the settlement did not require Dr. 
Wilson to admit to any wrongdoing or accept any blame for Jesse's death, 
which makes the requirement that he lecture on the lessons learned from the 
experience seem somewhat empty of expressive content. Unlike criminal 
punishment, these responses to Dr. Wilson's misconduct do not carry the 
collateral consequences of criminal punishment, and thus do not appear to 
express the same condemnation and moral blame. Once the time period of 
the FDA sanctions expires, Dr. Wilson is free to continue his work without 
restriction. ls9 
Dr. Wilson has never apologized to the Gelsinger family.lgO He still 
conducts researchlgl and remains a tenured professor at the University of 
Pennsylvania School of Medicine and chairman of its Molecular and 
Cellular Engineering ~e~ar tment . '~ '  Furthermore, Dr. Wilson lost none of 
his profits despite the fact that at the time of Jesse's death, he had financial 
interests in the study that may explain the motive behind his miscond~ct. '~~ 
Nothing prevents Dr. Wilson from profiting from conducting human subject research, 
even during the period of the restrictions. Arguably, in order to punish him for causing the 
death of another, he should no longer be able to profit from his research, similar to the way 
in which other offenders cannot profit by publishing a book about their crimes. 
He did resign from his position as the head of the Institute for Human Gene Therapy, 
but the Dean of the University of Pennsylvania Medical School made clear that his 
resignation had "nothing to do with the Gelsinger case." Emily Sanders, Researcher Wilson 
to Step Down as IHGT Head, DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN, Apr. 23, 2002, 
h t t p : / / m e d i a . w w w . d a i l y p e n n s y l v a n i a n . c o m / /  
Researcher.Wilson.To.Step.Down.As.Ihgt.Head-215765 1 ,shtml. 
Ig0 See Paul Gelsinger & Adil E. Shamoo, Eight Years ABer Jesse's Death, Are Human 
Research Subjects Any Safer?, 38 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 25 (2008), available at 
h~://www.sskrplaw.com/publications/gelsinger-april-O8.pdf ("The federal government 
charged the researchers and their institutions with fraud. The defendants entered into 
settlement agreements involving fines and other penalties. But there was no 
acknowledgment of responsibility, let alone wrongdoing, nor was there even a hint of 
remorse in the form of an apology."). 
19' See Univ. of Pa. Health Sys., ResearcMJames Wilson, http://m.uphs.upenn.edu/ 
penngen/research/wilson.html (last visited Feb. 2,2009) (describing Wilson's research). 
19' Sanders, supra note 189. 
lg3 Dr. Wilson was the founder of a biotech company, Genovo, in which both he and the 
University owned shares of stock. WEYERS, supra note 121, at 618. Contrjbutions from 
Genovo made up one-fifth of the $25 million annual budget of the Institute. Id. at 618-19 
(citation omitted). In fact, the University's conflict-of-interest rules were altered to permit 
Wilson to own 30% of the company's stock. See Diana L. Bush, Gene Therapy Triab: The 
Role of the National Institutes of Health and Conflics of Interest, 19 BIOTECH L. REP. 576, 
L. SONG RICHARDSON 
Although the Gelsinger family sued Dr. Wilson and the university,lg4 the 
case was settled, and only the University paid an undisclosed sum.19s 
Dr. Wilson was not prosecuted, although he could have been.lg6 The 
use of alternative sanctions resulted in Dr. Wilson receiving better treatment 
than similarly situated offenders; the failure to utilize criminal punishment 
expresses that Dr. Wilson is entitled to different or special treatment from 
the average offender because he is a well-respected and talented doctor 
conducting socially beneficial research. While he may have suffered some 
short-term humiliation, the state treated him very differently than it does 
586 (2000). The University also gave Wilson the exclusive right to license patents derived 
fiom the IHGT to Genovo and its corporate sponsors. See WEYERS, supra note 121, at 618- 
19 (citation omitted). A year after Jesse's death, Targeted Genetics Corporation acquired 
Genovo. Marie McCullough, Human Guinea Pigs on the Frontiers of Medicine, 
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, May 5, 2002, at Dl, available at http://www.sskrplaw.com~ 
publicationsl5-20guinea.html. Dr. Wilson received $13.5 million in Targeted stock, and the 
University received $1.4 million. Id. Researchers from other university hospitals who 
failed to abide by the regulations also held equity interests in the companies sponsoring their 
trials. Richard A. Knox, Physicians Deny Deaths Unreported, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 4, 
1999, at C1. 
The Gelsinger family sued Dr. Wilson and other researchers and institutions involved 
in the gene therapy trial for, among other things, wrongful death, intentional assault and 
battery, fraud, lack of informed consent, and fraud on the FDA. See Complaint, supra note 
169. The plaintiffs sought compensatory as well as punitive damages. Id, 
Ig5 The civil suit settled with the University paying an undisclosed amount to the 
Gelsinger family. See Family Se t tb  Suit over Patient's Death Following Gene Therapy 
Clinical Triab, 15 TOXIC L. REP. 1227 (2000). 
19' For instance, Dr. Wilson's failure to abide by the mandatory regulations governing 
the conduct of human subject experiments and thereby causing the death of Jesse Gelsinger 
is comparable to routinely prosecuted homicides. A person is guilty of murder when "it is 
committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of 
human life." MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES (j 210.2(l)(b) (1962). A person acts 
recklessly when he "consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk" that his acts 
will cause a particular result. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES 5; 2.02(2)(c). Here, 
Dr. Wilson consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death would 
result from his failure to comply with the regulations. The regulations are mandatory and 
consist of reporting requirements that are meant to ensure the rights and safety of human 
subjects. 21 C.F.R. 6 50.1 (2008) ("Compliance. . . is intended to protect the rights and 
safety of subjects involved in investigations. . . ."). The reporting of adverse events, for 
example, is required so that an independent body can continuously determine whether, at any 
point, the risks to an individual's welfare outweigh the benefits of the research. 21 C.F.R. 
$8 56.108, 56.109, 56.111(a)(2) (2008). Dr. Wilson's "repeated and deliberate" failure to 
report adverse events prevented the independent review body fiom performing its functions 
and ending the trial, as the FDA indicated it likely would have done. See supra note 189. 
Hence, his failure to abide by the mandatory reporting requirements created a substantial risk 
that a human life would be put at risk of death. The risk he took was unjustifiable because 
there was no justification for his failure to abide by the mandatory reporting requirements. 
Id. The mail fraud and wire fraud statutes could also provide sources of liability. See 18 
u.s.c. 8 1343 (2006) (wire fraud); id. 5; 1341 (mail fiaud). 
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other offenders who have caused the death of another indi~idual. '~~ 
The criminal brand has symbolic, practical, and expressive 
significance that other sanctions do not. It is rife with notions of censure 
and blamew~rthiness,"~ and justifies the imposition of punishment, which 
includes not only the potential loss of liberty, but also a host of collateral 
consequences. The use of any sanction short of criminal punishment risks 
causing expressive harm because the message is that what was done to the 
victim does not deserve criminal punishment and its collateral 
consequences. In other words, it is acceptable for this offender to treat this 
victim in this manner.lg9 
IV. THE UTILITY OF  DESERT^" 
Criminal punishment expresses moral condemnation in a way that 
alternative sanctions do not. This Part argues that imposing criminal 
punishment will also further instrumentalist goals, such as deterrencez0' and 
moral education, as a "happy consequence."202 How criminal punishment 
can serve these additional goals of punishment in the human 
experimentation context is discussed next. 
A. DETERRENCE 
Punishment can deter by vindicating the value of the victim through 
protection.203 This protective function works by issuing a "sting" that the 
IQ7 In fact, according to their attorney, the Gelsinger family is "surprised and 
disappointed at the seeming lack of any consequence to Wilson for the misdeeds that led to 
the death of Jesse Gelsinger." Sanders, supra note 189 (statement of Alan Milstein, 
Attorney for Jesse Gelsinger). 
Harry V. Ball & Lawrence M. Priedman, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in the 
Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REV. 197, 216 
(1965). 
19' FEINBERG, supra note 100, at 102-03. 
200 The title of this Part is borrowed from Paul H. Robinson & John M, Darley, The 
Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453 (1 997). 
20' MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 116, at 140 (explaining that the '"retributivist's 
notion of desert is derivedfiom punishment's role as a deterrent but is quite different from 
deterrence"). 
202 MICHAEL S. MOORE, THE MORAL WORTH OF RETRIBUTION, RESPONSIBILITY, 
CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179-82 (Ferdinand 
Schoeman ed., 1987); see MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 116, at 129-30 & 11.26 
(distinguishing the retributive motive, which is to annul the appearance of superiority of the 
wrongdoer, from other non-retributive motives, such as deterrence and moral education). 
This is not to say that deterrence is not an appropriate part of any just punishment scheme, 
but it is not the goal of retribution. Hampton, supra note 120, at 1659 & n.2. 
203 MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 1 16, at 138. 
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offender feels upon engaging in a prohibited act?04 The desire to avoid this 
pain in the future is how deterrence is achieved.'05 
Determining how best to deter misconduct in human subject research 
is important because the protection of human subject autonomy essentially 
falls upon the individual researcher. In theory, institutional bodies such as 
the FDA, NIH, and Institutional Review Boards (IRB)'O~ police misconduct 
by approving research protocols and conducting periodic audits. In 
practice, resource constraints make any consistent effort to ensure that 
human subjects are protected Since these institutions cannot 
audit even a small subset of human subject research, they rely upon 
researchers to provide truthful information in the study protocol when 
seeking approval to conduct research, to comply with follow-up reporting 
'04 Id. at 140. 
205 Id. 
'06 The role of the Institutional Review Board (IRB) is to review and approve research 
protocols and informed consent documents, ensuring that the safety of individuals will be 
adequately protected and that the benefits outweigh the risks. O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 331 
& n.93 (citing OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 23, at 3. Some companies have their 
own IRBs, and other IRBs operate independently, being hired by contract to study any 
management organization or researcher who wants their services. O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 
100. Their composition and duties are set forth by statute. See 21 C.F.R. $9 56.101, 56.103, 
56.109 (2008) (FDA); 45 C.F.R. $5 46.103,46.109 (2008) (NIH). Members usually consist 
of lay volunteers and members from the researcher's institution. See, sag., 21 C.F.R. 
§ 56.107 (FDA). 
'07 See also Gelsinger & Shamoo, supra note 190, at 25-27 ("Last year, a report by the 
inspector general of the Department of Health and Human Services found that the FDA, the 
agency responsible for overseeing most clinical trials, inspected just 1 percent of study sites. 
Small wonder, since it has a mere two hundred investigators and there are 350,000 sites." 
(citing OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., NO. OEI-01-06- 
00160, THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION'S OVERSIGHT OF CLINICAL TRIALS (2007); 
THE BALT. CONFERENCE ON ETHICS, ETHICS IN NEUROBIOLOGICAL RESEARCH WITH HUMAN 
SUBJECTS (Adil E. Shamoo ed., 1997)). IRBs are often overwhelmed with the amount of 
work they are required to do, and they are typically under-resourced. See Jonathan Moreno 
et al., Updating Protections for Human Subjects Involved in Research, 280 J .  AM. MED. 
ASS'N 1951, 1956 (1998); see also O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 336-37 & n.131 (noting that 
IRBs are overworked and underfunded (citing 1 NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, 
RESEARCH INVOLVING PERSONS WITH MENTAL DISORDERS THAT MAY AFFECT 
DECISIONMAKING CAPACITY 71 (1998))). The shortcomings of IRBs are frequently studied 
and discussed. See, e.g., O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 330 n.91. As one commentator 
recognized, ''[Ilt is now widely accepted that IRBs are overwhelmed by trial oversight 
responsibilities and documentation, are easily misled or ignored by researchers, and are 
unwilling to challenge institutional colleagues." Baram, supra note 24, at 267-68; see also 
Kus v. Sherman Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 1214, 1216-17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (involving a 
researcher that changed the informed consent form from the one that had been approved by 
the FDA by removing language that the intraocular lens was experimental. The defense 
expert testified that if the IRB had audited the researcher's charts, it would have discovered 
the discrepancy). 
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requirements, and to follow informed consent req~irements.'~~ Thus, the 
lack of consistent and reliable institutional oversight of human subject 
research fails to provide adequate deterrence incentives.209 
Researchers are essentially left to police themselves, and historically, 
they have failed in their efforts. It took a law student to bring an end to the 
Tuskegee syphilis experiments?10 the FDA to stop Dr. Kligman's 
experiments at Holmesburg Prison, the suspicions of a patient and his 
- 
'08 Although the FDA and the NIH do perform periodic inspections and audits, and IRBs 
have obligations to continue monitoring the research protocol subsequent to approval, all 
three bodies simply cannot monitor every human subject trial conducted. Site visits and 
audits are conducted by investigators for the FDA and NIH. O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 332; 
see U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., Office for Human Research Protections, 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/ (last visited Feb. 2,2009) (NIH procedures); U.S. Dep't of Health 
& Human Serv., U.S. Food and Drug Administration Home Page, http://www.fda.gov (last 
visited Feb. 2,2009) (FDA procedures). Very few trials are audited. O'Reilly, supra note 5, 
at 345. The FDA simply does not have the resources to meet its workload. Id. at 346 11.183 
(citing Frances 0. Kelsey, The Bioresearch Monitoring Program, 46 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 
59, 60-61 (1991)). In fact, the FDA's supervision of trials is a "discretionary function" 
depending on government priorities. O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 346 (citing 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2680(a) (1994)). The NIH also requires each institution to maintain its own audit system 
and to report problems in patient protection to the NIH. 45 C.F.R. 5 46.103(b)(5) (2008). 
IRBs frequently fail to continue review of approved studies. See O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 
332 (citing NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N ,supra note 207, at 71). 
209 See O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 333 ("The repercussions of embarrassment and cost 
would be a real deterrent if enforcement occurred more frequently and was more efficient 
than the slow process now in place."). 
210 The Tuskegee syphilis study was the longest experiment involving human subjects in 
United States history, running for forty years from 1932 until 1972. Katz, supra note 24, at 
230. During the now infamous study, researchers deliberately deceived 400 African- 
American men with syphilis, leaving the disease untreated in order to study the natural 
course of the disease. Id. Some men were not told that they had syphilis and were told that 
they were receiving routine medical treatment, while others were told that they were 
receiving treatment for the disease. Id. The experiments continued even after the 
government put regulations in place to protect human subjects and after an effective 
treatment for syphilis had been discovered. WASHINGTON, supra note 93, at 165-66. 
Articles detailing the experiments had been published in medical journals, and the results 
from the study had been shared at a 1936 American Medical Association meeting. Id. at 166; 
WEYERS, supra note 121, at 498-99. But it took a law student to put an end to it. WEYERS, 
supra note 121, at 582. When he learned of the experiments, he complained to public health 
service officials. Id. at 500. But the blue ribbon panel it assembled in response concluded 
that the unwitting subjects should continue to remain untreated. Id. Frustrated, he told a 
friend at the Associated Press, and on June 26, 1972, an article appeared in the New York 
Times. Id. at 502. As a result of public outrage, the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare terminated the study shortly thereafter. Id. By then, only seventy-four af  the 
original 400 test subjects were still alive. Id. Many doctors expressed the view that there 
had been nothing wrong with the study. Id. at 608. Some doctors argued that they had done 
nothing wrong because African-Americans suffering from syphilis would not have 
voluntarily sought treatment anyway. WASHINGTON, supra note 93, at 161. None of the 
individuals involved were ever criminally prosecuted. 
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lawyer to discover Dr. Golde's mining of Moore's body, and a death to 
expose the actions of Dr. Wilson. These are only a few instances of 
ineffective self-policing.2" Another example is the recent discovery that 
for over sixty years, researchers at the State University of Iowa (now Iowa 
University) concealed experiments performed on unwitting orphans. A 
professor at the University led experiments on children to test his 
hypothesis that stuttering was conditioned in children as the result of overly 
critical parents.212 With the University's knowledge and agreement, he 
tested his hypothesis at an orphanage, telling the orphanage that he was 
conducting a study to improve children's speech.213 During the course of 
the experiment, his research assistant very successfully made non-stuttering 
children into stutterers.214 After the experiment was over, very little effort 
was made to correct the stuttering they had induced in the children?l5 and 
the efforts they did make were largely unsuccessful.216 
Those involved in the study acknowledged that they were engaged in a 
"'monster experiment' that would, if discovered, be compared to the World 
War I1 experiments and ruin the careers of the scientists and researchers 
involved."217 Thus, they decided to conceal it. The experiment was 
discovered in 2001 only afcer the research assistant suffered an attack of 
conscience and alerted the press.218 
'I1 Concerned with the lack of compliance, after Jesse Gelsinger's death, the NIH 
reminded other gene therapy researchers of their reporting obligations. Bush, supra note 
193, at 576. Researchers responded with 691 adverse events that had not been disclosed as 
required. Id. The FDA and NIB investigations of other gene therapy trials confirmed that 
many human subjects had suffered from "adverse effects," many of which had not been 
reported by the researchers or organizations involved. Id. For example, medical researchers 
at Cornell University and Tufts University failed to report six deaths to NIH. See Deborah 
Nelson & Rick Weiss, Earlier Gene Test Deaths Not Reported: NIH Was Unaware of 
'Adverse Events, ' WASH. POST, Jan. 31,2000, at Al; Deborah Nelson & Rick Weiss, Gene 
Therapy Deaths Disclosed, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 3, 1999, at A10. Although some, if not all, 
of the deaths were the result of the subjects' underlying illnesses, researchers were still 
required to report the deaths to the oversight agencies. Nelson & Weiss, Gene Therapy 
Deaths Disclosed, supra. The FDA "suspended gene therapy trials at St. Elizabeth's 
Medical Center in Boston, a major teaching affiliate of Tufts University School of 
Medicine, . . . because scientists there failed to follow protocols and may have contributed to 
at least one patient death." Thompson, supra note 183. 
2'2 See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807,839 n. 32 (Md. 2001). 
=I3  Id. 
214 See id. 
21s Id. 
2t6 Id. 
.?Iir Id. 
21x Id. 
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The threat of criminal punishment would likely have important 
deterrent effects on  researcher^.^'^ Currently, a researcher engaged in 
calculated risk-taking knows that if he violates human subject protections, 
the likelihood of discovery is minimal and even if discovered, he will not be 
prosecuted. At most, he may pay compensatory damageszz0 or face 
temporary restrictions on his research.221 The "sting" of criminal 
punishment, including the stigma of being branded a criminal, risk of 
imprisonment, and message of disapproval, denunciation, and reproach, is 
more serious than that provided by alternative sanctions. The fear of being 
labeled a criminal will likely be felt strongly by researchers because they 
are a class that is prone to view themselves as different from the common 
Hence, the consequences of criminal punishment can be 
expected to deter more effectively than other sanctions even if the 
possibility that culpable acts will be discovered remains equally 
'I9 John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawfil" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the 
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 193 (1991) 
(arguing that criminal punishment operates "as a system of moral education and 
socializing"); Hampton, supra note 113, at 17 ("The use of punishment may be particularly 
desirable if a person or legal institution wants to take advantage of the deterrent value of 
retributive sufferinr.."). 
- r 
220 The tort system has often proved inadequate to protect human subjects. Issues such 
as whether a researcher owes a duty of care to the subject remain an open question. See 
Alvino, supra note 24, at 910-12. Furthermore, subjects must demonstrate cognizable injury 
prior to recovery, and actual physical injury may not result from a violation of informcd 
consent. Although most jurisdictions allow recovery without physical injury for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, id. at 913 n.140, "damages . . . may be difficult to prove in 
the absence of physical harm. , . ." Saver, supra note 20, at 226, cited in Alvino, supra note 
24, at 913 n.140. 
See supra notes 186-2 12 and accompanying text (discussing the sanctions faced by 
Dr. Wilson as a result of his role in Jesse Gelsinger's death). In fact, even when misconduct 
is demonstrated, fellow researchers tend to rally around the accused. See supra note I83 and 
accompanying text (discussing the response of researchers to Dr. Kligman and Dr. Wilson). 
222 See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 356 (1968) ("Pcople 
who value their standing in the community are likely to be especially sensitive to the stigma 
associated with a criminal conviction."); Ball & Friedman, supra note 198, at 216-17 
f"Business abhor the idea of being branded a criminal . . . . [B'Jusinessmen, after all. fi~rm a 
large, respectable, and influential class in our society."); Arthur L. Liman, The Paper Lubd 
Sentences: Critiques, 86 YALE L.J. 630, 630-3 1 (1977) ("To the businessman, . . . prison i s  
the inferno, and conventional risk-reward analysis breaks down when the risk is jail."), 
223 See, e.g., JOEL FESNBERG, Crime, Clutchabili@, and Individuated Treatment, in Dr~rru'c; 
AND DESERVING, supra note 100, at 252,263 (claiming that punishment is appropriate for 
rational risk-takers]; Mary M. Cheh, Consfifufional Limits on Using Civil Remedie's fo 
Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil tau* 
Distinction, 42 RASTMGS L.J. 1325, 1355 (1991) ("[Tlhe rheory is that humans, as rational 
weighers of the risks and benefits of their actions, will risk being penalized if the worst t h q  
face is having to pay market value for their illicit gains."); Steven Shavell, Criminul Lau*und 
the Optimal Use of Nonmonetav Sanctions as a Deferrent, 85 GOL~M.  L. RLV. 1232.1237- 
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B. MORAL EDUCATION 
Punishment can also be an effective moral educator.224 The infliction 
of pain serves an educative function because it "interferes with the 
offender's pursuit of his interests, draws his attention to the crime and 
society's condemnation of it, and conveys to him that certain actions are 
'fenced off in virtue of what we take to be their immoral character."'225 The 
criminal law's educative and socializing role is arguably necessary to teach 
researchers that violations of autonomy and dignity are wrong despite the 
potential utility of the research. 
There is evidence that research community norms may serve to 
facilitate misconduct. First, researchers have been resistant to attempts to 
place mandatory limits on their research. For example, many researchers 
objected to the binding nature of the Nuremberg Code as an appropriate 
guide for their behavior. The Code was created in response to the atrocities 
committed by Nazi doctors during the Second World War and forms the 
basis for the protection of human subjects in the United States today.226 It 
establishes a set of mandatory, explicit, and uniform ethical guidelines and 
standards to govern the conduct of medical research on humans.227 Its ten 
principles seek to attain two broad goals. First, it aspires to protect 
autonomy by giving human subjects the absolute right to decide whether to 
participate in experiments and to end their participation at any time.228 
Second, it aims to protect the welfare of human subjects either by 
prohibiting certain risky research from being conducted at all or by 
38 (1985) ("Nonmonetary sanctions may be helpful of course because their threatened use 
might deter parties who could not be deterred by monetary sanctions alone."). 
224 Some philosophers do not believe that moral education is a legitimate goal of 
punishment. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, in THE MORAL IMITS OF THE CRIMINAL AW, supra 
note 144, at 295. 
225 Hampton, supra note 1 13, at 21. 
226 The Code forms the basis for the protection of human subjects in the United States 
today. Michael A. Grodin, Historical Origins of the Nurernberg Code, in THE NAZI 
DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 24, at 139. In the 1950s, the NIH adopted 
guidelines providing that "[tlhe rigid safeguards observed at NIH are based on the so-called 
'ten commandments' of human medical research which were adopted at the Nuremberg War 
Crime trials after the atrocities performed by Nazi doctors had been exposed." Leonard H. 
Glantz, Influence of fhe Nurernberg Code on US.  Statutes, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE 
NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 24, at 185. An integral feature of the laws governing human 
subject research is the protection of the autonomy and dignity of human subjects. See 45 
C.F.R. $8 46.101-46.409 (2008). 
227 Grodin, supra note 226, at 121; WASHINGTON, supra note 93, at 258. 
228 See Office of Human Subjects Research, Nat'l Insts. of Health, Directives for Human 
Experimentation: Nuremberg Code, provisions 1, 9, http://oh~r.od.nih.~ov/guideiines 
1nuremberg.html (last visited Feb. 2,2009). 
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requiring researchers to terminate an experiment at any stage if its 
continuation is "likely to result in injury, disability, or death."229 
Researchers rejected the Code as "a good code for barbarians but an 
unnecessary code for ordinary They thought that the Code's 
"legalistic" demands were unnecessary and unduly burdensome to 
research.231 As a former Dean of the Hmard Medical School put it: 
[Tlhe Nuremberg Code was conceived in reference to Nazi atrocities and was 
written for the specific purpose of preventing brutal excesses from being committed or 
excused in the name of science. The code, however admirable in its intent, and 
however suitable for the purpose for which it was conceived, is in our opinion not 
necessarily pertinent to or adequate for the conduct of medical research in the United 
232 States. 
Second, the research community appears to resist efforts to effectively 
investigate allegations of misconduct. For example, after Dr. Kligmanys 
actions at Holmesburg Prison came to light, attempts were made by the 
American Academy of Dermatology to discover more information about his 
research at the prison. The Academy created a task force that sent letters to 
the researchers involved in the experiments asking for comments. The 
letters referenced the atrocities at Nuremberg, When Academy officers 
learned of this, they were furious.233 They not only immediately informed 
the task force that it had not been authorized "to suggest that [the] 
experiments may have been in violation of the Nuremberg but 
229 Glantz, supra note 226, at 184 (referring to provisions 2-8 and 10 of the Nuremberg 
Code); Grodin, supra note 226, at 121. 
230 Katz, supra note 24, at 228. 
231 A Harvard researcher, Henry Beecher, described the Code as "a rigid act of legalistic 
demands. . . a legalistic document. . . . Until recently the Western world was threatened 
with the imposition of the Nuremberg Code as Western credo." See George J. Annas, The 
Nuremberg Code in U.S. Courts: Ethics Versus Expediency, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE 
NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 24, at 201, 201-05. This researcher rejected rigid rules, 
stating in 1959 that "the problems of human experimentation do not lend themselves to a 
series of rigid rules. In most cases, these are more likely to do more harm than good." 
WEYERS, supra note 121, at 377 (citing H.K. Beecher, Experimentation on Human Beings, 
169 J .  AM. MED. ASS'N 461-78 (1959)). 
232 WEYERS, supra note 121, at 401. Courts have not utilized the Code as a basis for 
liability. But see Grimes v. Kennedy JSrieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807,1134 (Md. 200If. Courts 
have cited the Nuemberg Code with approval. See, e.g., United States. v. Stanley, 483 U.5. 
669, 686 (1987) (O'Conner, J., dissenting); id. at 686-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Heinrich 
ex rel. Heinrich v. Sweet, 62 F. Supp. 2d 282,321 (D. Mass. 1999); White v. Paulsen, 997 F. 
Supp. 1380, 1383-84 (E.D. Wash. 1998) Hoover v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Sew., 
984 F. Supp. 978, 978 (S.D. W. Va. 1997), a m ,  129 F.3d 1259 (1 lth Cir. 1997); 1n re 
Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 821-22 (S.D. Ohio 1995); Whitlock v. Duke 
Univ., 637 F. Supp. 1463,1470-71 (M.D.N.C. 1986), ufd, 829 F.2d 1340 (4th Cir. 1987). 
233 WEYERS, supra note 121, at 612. 
234 Id. (citation omitted). 
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they also immediately sent apologies to each researcher who had received 
the letter. 
Finally, the research community tends to defend culpable researchers 
and downplay the harm. For instance, with respect to Dr. Wilson and the 
death of Jesse Gelsinger, some members of his community stated that the 
sanctions against him were unwarranted. When the University of 
Pennsylvania restricted Dr. Wilson's ability to conduct experiments on 
humans235 and decided to stop manufacturing genetically-altered viruses, a 
leading scientist in the field said that the University's move was an 
overreaction. "This is throwing the baby out with the bath water . . . . It 
basically eliminates the gene therapy program if you can't run trials."23" 
Another prominent and well-respected professor, ethicist, and director of 
the gene therapy program at the University of California, San Diego stated 
that Jesse's death was "[alt worst, . . . another pothole in the road."237 
Comments such as these underscore that research norms are in need of 
modification-a need that can be well addressed by criminal sanctions. The 
criminal sanction can shape or even change norms or preferences within a 
community because people in part learn what is morally blameworthy 
through what is punished.238 The sanction teaches people, both potential 
offenders and the community at large, what the public morality is, whether 
or not they fully internalize it.239 Criminal punishment can be used self- 
consciously "to change beliefs, attitudes, and personal values and goals 
[and] can effectuate policy considerations by influencing what a person 
thinks he ought to do or what he wants to do in a particular situation."240 
Some scholars even argue that the criminal category is not about public 
235 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Institute Restricted After Gene Therapy Death, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 25, 2000, at A20. He was required to restrict his work to the study of molecules and 
cells, and to experiment only on animals. Id. 
236 Id. 
237 See Stephen S. Hall, A Death in Philadekhia, MIT TECH. REV., Jan. 2000, at 2, 
available at h~~p:~~.technologyreview.com/biomedicine/i20i~/~a~e1/ (stat ment of 
Theodore Friedmann, Director, Program in Human Gene Therapy, University of California). 
238 See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a 
Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 24 (noting that the criminal sanction is a 
particularly powerful tool to shape the preferences of the individual defendant and of society 
at large). 
2S9 Ball & Friedman, supra note 198, at 217,222; Coffee, supra note 219, at 223. 
240 Ball & Friedman, supra note 198, at 220. "Often law tries to redefine roles." Cass Re 
Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 923 (1996). "For 
example, the law has said that husbands may not rape their wives . . . . All of these measures 
can be seen as attempts to create new or better norms to define the relevant roles." Id.; id. at 
913 ("A good deal of governmental action is self-consciously designed to change norms, 
meyFgs, or roles, and in that way to increase the individual benefits or decrease the 
mdlvldual costs associated with certain acts."); Ball & Friedman, supra note 198, at 220. 
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morality at all, but "[rlather, . . . a set of techniques to be manipulated for 
social ends."241 Changing social norms can, in turn, "influence 
choices. . .by altering the effects of reputational incentives and 
consequences for self-conception."242 If the criminal sanction is successful 
in shaping social norms, then behaving in a manner inconsistent with them 
will result in "public disapproval," which in turn will produce 
"embarrassment or perhaps shame and a desire to hide."243 
To the extent that idealization bias and social benefit bias affects 
public views about researcher criminal punishment can help 
"rekindle in the public a sense of the immorality of the defendant's 
Its power to express moral condemnation may more effectively deter 
misconduct and change both researchers' and society's views concerning 
bad acts. Criminal punishment can help overcome the idealization bias and 
social benefit biases that currently appear to exist in the context of human 
subject experimentation. 
I have argued that criminal punishment may be the only sanction that 
can punish culpable medical actors engaged in intentional misconduct that 
violates individual rights to autonomy, dignity, and self-determination. I 
have considered this question in the context of bad acts involving the lack 
of consent. I end by considering some preliminary questions and concerns 
that use of the criminal sanction may raise, although I do not intend to 
resolve them here.246 
Punishment raises the specter of over-deterrence. With regard to the 
forms of misconduct discussed in this Article, there exists little difficulty in 
distinguishing bad acts from good ones. However, if use of criminal 
punishment will be extended to police other forms of research misconduct, 
this question of over-deterrence will require further scrutiny. If mistaken or 
negligent acts cannot be consistently and accurately distinguished from 
wrongful ones before imposing punishment, the fear of erroneous 
241 Ball & Friedman, supra note 198, at 211; see also Mann, supra note 104, at 1807 
(acknowledging that punishment can be viewed as a means of social control). 
242 Sunstein, supra note 240, at 916. Cass Sunstein defines norms as "social attitudes of 
approval or disapproval, specifying what ought to be done and what ought not to be done." 
Id. at 914. 
243 Id. at 915. 
214 See Burrows, supra note 92. 
245 Ball & Friedman, s u p  note 198, at 222; see also id, at 217 (explaining that criminal 
punishment can make "the proscribed conduct illegitimate in the eyes of a potential actor, 
even when the actor disagrees with the purpose of the law"). 
246 These will be discussed in future Articles. 
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identification as a culpable actor may keep well-intentioned actors from 
engaging in research.247 Additionally, if the line between good and bad acts 
in medical research is a fine one, researchers may become excessively 
cautious in order to avoid wrongful exposure to criminal punishment. The 
argument against criminal punishment, then, is that when there exists 
difficulty distinguishing between acts we want to encourage and those we 
do not, it is more appropriate to price rather than to prohibit the behavior.248 
Another concern with criminal punishment is that vigorous 
enforcement and stringent penalties may make it difficult to discover 
unlawful acts in human subject research. Recent work in the area of system 
justification theory posits that these responses may cause system justifying 
behaviors-behaviors amongst actors in the system that inhibit detection 
and prevention efforts.249 Empirical research into the culture and practices 
of the research community will be necessary before any prediction can be 
made about the effect punishment will have on researcher motivations. 
However, if criminal punishment will result in increased difficulty in 
ferreting out research crime, this is an important question to consider. 
If criminal punishment is deserved in appropriate circumstances, then 
serious thought must be given to the amount of punishment necessary to 
humble the wrongdoers. If researchers are prosecuted under existing 
criminal statutes, do the sentencing schemes map well with what the 
appropriate sentence should be? In some cases, the punishment provided 
by existing'criminal statutes may be too severe, and in others, too lenient. 
If new crimes or sentencing schemes are appropriate, then there are 
institutional problems to consider. The existence of idealization bias and 
social benefit bias creates a chicken-and-egg problem. The biases may 
result in the failure to impose punishment, but imposing punishment may be 
necessary to change the existing biases. Punishment can reduce the efficacy 
of these biases, but the existence of them may make prosecutors unwilling 
to proceed with criminal prosecutions. Additionally, the biases may also 
affect legislators' willingness to pass criminal legislation or sentencing 
schemes to punish researchers, especially because one can expect 
significant resistance from the medical profession to criminal sanctions 
247 See generally Craig S. Lerner & Moin A. Yahya, ' l e f t  Behind" After Sarbanes- 
Oxley, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1383,1384 (2007) (arguing that "soaring penalties for corporate 
crimes and dilution of a mens rea requirement. . . could have the consequences 
of creating more corporate crime" as people with high moral standards choose to leave the 
field). 
2 i  Cooter, supra note 149, at 1524 ("If lawmakers can identify socially desirable 
behavior, but are prone to error in assessing the cost of deviations from it, then sanctions are 
preferable to prices."). 
249 Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System JustiJcation meory and Research: Implications 
for Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CAL. L. REV. 11 19,1160 (2006). 
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directed specifically at them.250 How do we address this? Perhaps the first 
step is to at least recognize the problem. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The fact that human subject research is socially beneficial should not 
mean that culpable acts go unpunished. Criminal punishment in appropriate 
instances would send a clear, expressive message that doctors are not 
privileged to treat human subjects in a manner inconsistent with their 
inherent value as human beings. Punishment can reassert 
acknowledgement of the victim's worth in the face of a denial. Proper 
punishment will cause suffering in the offender and demonstrate to 
researchers that their actions are worthy of stigma, ridicule, and shame, and 
in this way, perhaps change the attitudes of the relevant community. This, 
in turn, will restore the proper balance between protecting human dignity 
and autonomy, and allowing socially beneficial research to continue. It will 
also likely make the self-policing nature of the existing regulations more 
effective. Punishment will help change the existing biases, which can in 
turn change the existing norms and place the protection of individuals front 
and center instead of allowing individuals to be used as guinea pigs in favor 
of broader societal goals. If we are serious about protecting individual 
autonomy and dignity in research, consideration of criminal punishment is 
an important step. 
250 For example, in 2002, two representatives introduced the Human Research Subject 
Protection Act of 2002 which would increase protections for human subjects. H.R. 4697, 
107th Cong. (2002), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dIO7:h.r.O4697:. 
As of 2005, however, the bill has not come up for a vole. Id. Sherman, Silverstein, Kohl, 
Rose & Podolsky, Chronology, http://www.sskrplaw.com/articles/pdf/biochron6.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 2,2009). Similarly, Senator Kennedy's bill, the Research Revitalization Act of 
2002, which would also increase human subject protections, has not yet come up for a vote. 
S. 3060, 107th Cong. (20021, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-binlbdqueryl 
z?d107:s.03060. 
